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Security audit

微博转文字 Weibo to text (LinkDigest)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill uses a disclosed online service to extract Weibo content, with no evidence of hidden data collection or harmful local actions.

Use this skill if you are comfortable sending the complete supplied link or share text to LinkDigest. Keep the API key in environment variables or skill configuration, and use --max-credits to limit spending. Review the provider's privacy terms; its retention practices and extraction accuracy were not independently verified.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 103, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/linkdigest.py (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

python
if data is not None:
        req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout, context=_SSL["context"]) as resp:
            status, headers, raw = resp.status, resp.headers, resp.read()
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
        status, headers, raw = err.code, err.headers, err.read()

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The core API workflow is consistent with the declared extraction purpose; remote processing, API-key authentication, polling, and output formatting are supporting implementation details. However, the client also explicitly requests translation and viral-content analysis, which are substantive capabilities not disclosed in the description. The supplied chunk delegates actual extraction to a remote service, so it cannot independently establish that all advertised Weibo fields are returned. It shows no unrelated local file collection or command execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

直接调 HTTP：

bash
curl -sS -X POST https://linkdigest.dev/api/v1/digest \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LINKDIGEST_API_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "https://m.weibo.cn/detail/<ID>", "format": "json"}'