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Security audit

md-to-linkedin

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because its optional table-image rendering sends Markdown content to Chromium with its sandbox disabled, creating a security concern; no malicious intent was established.

Consider the Chromium rendering concern and the undeclared tool scope before installing. The scan was partial because three local references could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete; the suspicious verdict calls for review and does not mean the author is malicious.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The optional table-image path passes table HTML to Chromium before removing dangerous attributes and embedded elements, allowing untrusted Markdown to trigger JavaScript handlers or external resource requests during rendering. Chromium is also launched with --no-sandbox, removing an important containment boundary and increasing the consequences of a browser exploit; the argument list prevents shell injection but does not prevent this active-content exposure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/md2rich.py (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

python
png_path = out.with_name(f".{out.stem}.shot.png")
    html_path.write_text(_table_page(str(table), out.stem), encoding="utf-8")

    subprocess.run(
        ["chromium", "--headless", "--no-sandbox", "--disable-gpu",
         "--hide-scrollbars", "--force-device-scale-factor=2",
         f"--window-size={width},4000", f"--screenshot={png_path}",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/md2rich.py (reported line 153)May include surrounding context.

python
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
        timeout=120, check=True,
    )
    subprocess.run(
        ["magick", str(png_path), "-trim", "+repage",
         "-bordercolor", "white", "-border", "12", str(out)],
        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/md2rich.py (reported line 339)May include surrounding context.

python
# it in its own session: forked into ours, it dies when the parent's
            # process group is cleaned up, and the paste then finds an empty
            # clipboard. Detached, it outlives this script.
            proc = subprocess.Popen(
                ["wl-copy", "-f", "--type", "text/html"],
                stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True, start_new_session=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/md2rich.py (reported line 359)May include surrounding context.

python
if args.docx and not args.print_html:
        try:
            subprocess.run(
                ["soffice", "--headless", "--convert-to", "docx",
                 "--outdir", str(out.parent), str(out)],
                stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,