T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:33- Finding
Unpinned Global npm Package Introduces Supply-Chain Code Execution Risk
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:33(also documented inREADME.md:22)
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installed globally
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash npm install -g 1688alphaclawTechnical Analysis
The skill instructs users to install the external
1688alphaclawnpm package globally without specifying an exact version or package integrity value. Consequently, npm resolves the package to the version associated with the current registry tag, normallylatest, rather than to a release reviewed alongside this skill.The dependency's implementation is not included in the audited project, so its behavior, lifecycle scripts, credential handling, endpoint validation, and filesystem operations cannot be independently verified. Global npm installation may execute package lifecycle scripts and installs a command that subsequently operates with the invoking user's privileges.
This exposure is particularly significant because the documentation assigns the installed CLI access to AK/SK credentials stored in
~/.alphaclaw/auth.json, project directories used for skill installation, and directories packaged for publication. It also documents support for overriding the API base URL. A compromised package maintainer account, malicious release, registry compromise, or package ownership transfer could therefore change the effective executable payload after this skill has been reviewed.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package ownership, registry delivery path, or another component of the package's dependency chain.
- The attacker publishes a malicious version of
1688alphaclawand assigns it to the package's default distribution tag. - A user follows the skill instructions and runs
npm install -g 1688alphaclaw. - npm retrieves the attacker-controlled release because the command does not pin a reviewed version or verify a fi ...[truncated 1282 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Pin the dependency to an exact, independently reviewed version, for example:
bash npm install -g 1688alphaclaw@1.0.2Do not use version ranges or mutable distribution tags for security-sensitive tooling.
-
Publish or vendor the corresponding CLI source so its lifecycle scripts, transitive dependencies, authentication logic, filesystem behavior, archive construction, and network requests can be audited.
-
Provide a lockfile and verified package integrity digest. Document a trusted verification procedure using registry provenance, signed release artifacts, or equivalent cryptographic attestations.
-
Prefer a project-local installation over a global installation. Execute it through a controlled wrapper and use a dedicated, least-privileged account or isolated environment when practical.
-
Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where compatible:
bash npm install --ignore-scripts --save-exact 1688alphaclaw@1.0.2 -
Review and pin all transitive dependencies, enable automated dependency monitoring, and require reproducible builds and protected package publication workflows.
-
Ensure
~/.alphaclaw/auth.jsonis created with owner-only permissions, stores only the minimum necessary authentication material, and is never included in logs, archives, or debug output. -
Restrict API endpoint overrides to HTTPS endpoints from an explicit allowlist, and clearly warn users that directing an authenticated client to an untrusted endpoint may expose credentials or sensitive request data.
-
