Back to skill

Security audit

RealBrowser by Ceki

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is transparent about remote Chrome automation, but its installer fetches an unpinned third-party SDK and may modify the Python environment, so it needs review before installation.

Install only if you trust Ceki, the ceki-sdk package, and the remote browser hosts you use. Prefer Self mode for sensitive work, do not enter secrets into Marketplace sessions, stop rentals promptly, and consider installing a pinned SDK version in an isolated environment rather than running the provided pip upgrade command.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
install.sh:8
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party SDK Installation from a Mutable Package Registry

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: install.sh:8-15
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency installation and unsafe modification of a system-managed Python environment
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

sh
if command -v pip3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    pip3 install --upgrade ceki-sdk --break-system-packages 2>/dev/null \
        || pip3 install --upgrade --user ceki-sdk
elif command -v pip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    pip install --upgrade ceki-sdk --break-system-packages 2>/dev/null \
        || pip install --upgrade --user ceki-sdk
else
    echo "❌ pip not found. Install Python 3.10+ first."
    exit 1
fi

Related unpinned installation instructions also appear in:

  • SKILL.md:56-60
  • README.md:33-37
  • examples/python-quickstart.py:7-9
  • examples/node-quickstart.ts:6-8

The manifest only specifies a lower bound rather than a reviewed release:

json
"dependencies": {
  "ceki-sdk": ">=2.18.0"
}

Technical Analysis

The installation script uses pip install --upgrade without an exact version, lockfile, or package hash. Consequently, the code installed and executed is determined by the package registry at installation time rather than by the audited project contents. A future release of ceki-sdk, one of its transitive dependencies, or a compromised publisher account could therefore change the effective behavior after this skill has been reviewed.

Python package installation can execute package build hooks and install executable entry points. The installed ceki client subsequently receives the CEKI_API_KEY, controls remote browser sessions, processes screenshots and chat messages, and reads or writes session state. A malicious package version would run locally with the privileges of the user invoking the installer and could access data available to that account.

The initial installation attempt also uses --break-system-packages. This bypasses ...[truncated 2509 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the SDK to an exact, reviewed version, for example:
    sh
    python3 -m pip install "ceki-sdk==2.18.0"
    
  2. Require package integrity verification using --require-hashes and a checked-in requirements file containing hashes for the SDK and all transitive dependencies:
    sh
    python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.lock
    
  3. Remove --break-system-packages. Create an isolated virtual environment or use pipx instead:
    sh
    python3 -m venv "$HOME/.local/share/realbrowser/venv"
    "$HOME/.local/share/realbrowser/venv/bin/python" -m pip install \
      --require-hashes -r requirements.lock
    
  4. Replace "ceki-sdk": ">=2.18.0" in manifest.json with an exact reviewed version and update it only through a controlled dependency-review process.
  5. Pin the Node.js package to an exact version and provide a committed lockfile with integrity metadata.
  6. Avoid automatic upgrades during normal installation. Publish version updates as explicit, reviewed skill releases.
  7. Verify package provenance through signed releases or registry attestations where available, and document the expected publisher and package hashes.
  8. Run dependency scanning and software-composition analysis before approving each updated SDK or lockfile.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as browser-driving functionality, but in practice it instructs users to install third-party software, configure an API key, and interact with remote services and a browser marketplace. This mismatch can mislead operators about the trust boundary and causes them to grant execution, network, and credential access they may not expect from the description alone.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'info_stealer': Information stealer patterns (credential harvesting, browser data theft) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 293)May include surrounding context.

md
s on `example.com` / `httpbin` — use a headless Chrome locally
- Pure HTTP API calls — use a regular fetch tool, no browser needed
- Cached static content — use existing scrapers
- Anything you wouldn't be allowed to do manually

## Privacy + data handling

- **No personal data is transmitted to Ceki** beyond the API key (Bearer auth) and the task payload you explicitly send via the SDK
- **Cookies, credentials, browsing history** are not transmitted to the server — they live inside the rented Chrome session and are discarded when the session ends
- **In marketplace mode**, the host of the Chrome can see whatever your session is doing on their screen. Treat the host as a third party. Do not use marketplace sessions for confidential work.
- **In earn mode**, the renter of your Chrome can see whatever their session is doing in your browser, but not your other tabs, saved passwords, or local files (the session runs in a clean Chrome profile)

## License

MIT. See `LICENSE`.

## Li

YARA rule 'info_stealer': Information stealer patterns (credential harvesting, browser data theft) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · clawhub-listing.md (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

md
o use.
- **No filesystem writes outside ~/.ceki/sessions/** — session state files only
- **Network outbound limited to ceki.me subdomains** (declared in manifest)
- **No process spawn beyond ceki CLI**
- **Self mode** does not transmit user's Chrome data to third parties — sessions are routed through Ceki's dispatcher only for agent task execution, and the server is stateless between rentals (cookies and storage live inside the rented Chrome and are discarded on session end)
- **Marketplace mode** explicitly warns that the host can see the session, with guidance to use Self mode for sensitive workflows
- **Earn mode** is off by default, opt-in, and runs in a sandboxed Chrome profile (other agents who rent your Chrome cannot see your other tabs, saved passwords, or local files)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The skill requests and uses sensitive capabilities such as environment-variable access for CEKI_API_KEY and local file writes for screenshots/profile export, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes it harder for a platform or reviewer to understand and constrain what the skill may access before execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This step sends the bearer API key to an external endpoint for token introspection. Even though this is an expected product workflow, it is still an external transmission of credentials to a third-party service and expands the attack surface if users run the command in the wrong environment, with logging enabled, or without understanding the trust boundary.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 277)May include surrounding context.

ceki --help | head -1 echo "$CEKI_API_KEY" | head -c 4 # should start with ag_

Manually verify token (one-off, when you're ready):

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CEKI_API_KEY" https://api.ceki.me/api/auth/introspect | jq '.tokenable_id, .name'

Discover available browsers

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CEKI_API_KEY" https://api.ceki.me/api/browsers/search | jq '.meta.total'

text

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The browser discovery call transmits the bearer API key to the remote Ceki API and reveals account-linked usage metadata. While normal for the service, this is still network egress involving credentials and should be treated as sensitive because the skill depends on a third-party backend not declared in tool permissions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 279)May include surrounding context.

Manually verify token (one-off, when you're ready):

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CEKI_API_KEY" https://api.ceki.me/api/auth/introspect | jq '.tokenable_id, .name'

Discover available browsers

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CEKI_API_KEY" https://api.ceki.me/api/browsers/search | jq '.meta.total'

text

## When NOT to use

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The marketplace mode description advertises renting another user's Chrome session without presenting an immediate, prominent warning that the host can observe activity performed in that browser. Because users may infer privacy similar to a normal remote browser service, they could expose credentials, session contents, support dashboards, or regulated data to an untrusted host. In this context, the skill's core function makes the omission more dangerous because the privacy risk is intrinsic to the product, not incidental.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tainted flow: 'png' from os.environ.get (line 47, credential/environment) → pathlib.Path.write_bytes (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/python-quickstart.py (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

python
png = await browser.screenshot(format="png")
        out = Path("/tmp/ceki_quickstart.png")
        out.write_bytes(png)
        print(f"Screenshot saved: {out}")

        snap = await browser.snapshot()

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes renting and driving other users’ Chrome sessions, and only later notes that marketplace sessions are visible to the host. Because the primary description and summary do not prominently warn about host visibility, users may unknowingly expose credentials, sensitive page contents, or private workflows while assuming the browser behaves like a private local session.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.