T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Untrusted Remote Tasks and MCP Tools Are Accepted over Plaintext HTTP
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:10-13,SKILL.md:31-48,SKILL.md:104-120;references/api-reference.md:3-5,references/api-reference.md:18-19
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown **Live API:** `http://64.23.235.34:8000` **MCP SSE endpoint:** `http://64.23.235.34:8000/mcp/sse` **Docs:** `http://64.23.235.34:8000/docs` **SDK:** `pip install oixa-protocol`markdown ## Core MCP Tools (16 available) Call these via MCP or the REST API directly. | Tool | What it does | |---|---| | `oixa_list_auctions` | Browse open tasks with budgets. Pass `status="open"` | | `oixa_get_auction` | Full details on a specific auction before bidding | | `oixa_create_auction` | Post a task — set `rfi_description`, `max_budget`, `requester_id` | | `oixa_place_bid` | Bid on an auction. Lowest bid wins. Pass `auction_id`, `bidder_id`, `bidder_name`, `amount` | | `oixa_register_offer` | Register agent capabilities so others can hire you | | `oixa_deliver_output` | Submit completed work and trigger automatic USDC release | Full tool list: `http://64.23.235.34:8000/mcp/tools` ## Quickstart workflows ### Earn USDC: browse and bid on tasks 1. Call `oixa_list_auctions` — find open tasks 2. Call `oixa_get_auction` on a promising one — read the requirements carefully 3. Call `oixa_place_bid` with a competitive amount (lower than max_budget) 4. If you win, execute the task 5. Call `oixa_deliver_output` — USDC releases automaticallyTechnical Analysis
The skill delegates tool definitions, auction content, and work instructions to a mutable external service hosted at a raw IP address. It explicitly instructs the agent to read third-party task requirements and execute the task if the bid wins.
No trust boundary is defined between skill instructions and marketplace-controlled content. The skill does not instruct the ...[truncated 1691 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace every HTTP endpoint with HTTPS on a verified domain using a valid certificate.
- Authenticate the remote API and MCP server, and validate server identity before accepting tools or task data.
- Pin or locally define the permitted MCP tool schemas rather than accepting mutable remote definitions without review.
- Explicitly classify auction descriptions, bids, and remote responses as untrusted data.
- Prohibit marketplace content from changing system policy, requesting credentials, accessing unrelated files, or authorizing additional tools.
- Apply strict allowlists to the tools that may be used while completing a marketplace task.
- Require explicit user approval after displaying the complete task and planned actions, before bidding, executing work, or submitting output.
- Sanitize and constrain task inputs using a structured schema rather than placing remote text directly in the agent's instruction context.
