T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
references/setup-and-platforms.md:33- Finding
Downloaded Installer Is Executed Without Cryptographic Integrity Verification
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Hive skill is mostly coherent, but it asks agents to rely on powerful local workflow tooling with broad execution permissions and weakly pinned installation paths.
Install only if you trust the Hive publisher, the Homebrew tap or installer source, and the Hive CLI's workflow permission model. Review generated workflows before running them, be cautious with Honeycomb workflow installs, and prefer explicit previews or narrower permissions for workflows that do not need unrestricted local execution.
references/setup-and-platforms.md:33Downloaded Installer Is Executed Without Cryptographic Integrity Verification
SKILL.md:8Automatically Installable CLI Dependency Is Sourced from an Unpinned Personal Homebrew Tap
references/workflow-permissions.md:3Generated Agent Stages Default to Unrestricted Local Execution Permissions
references/safety.md:30Third-Party Honeycomb Workflows May Be Installed Without Explicit Permission Approval
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Read [workflow-creator.md](references/workflow-creator.md) when ordinary language asks to create a new project-local workflow. This focused route is the `hive
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Read [safety.md](references/safety.md) before any admin, force, credential, external-publication, deployment, or release-sensitive operation.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
For Arch, display the selected transaction and ask the user to run it in their
real terminal. Never add `--noconfirm` or execute the transaction through a
non-TTY agent tool call.
On supported Ubuntu or compatible glibc Linux, download the version-pinned
The skill description is extremely broad and covers many operational, diagnostic, workflow-creation, QA, recovery, and setup tasks. In agentic systems that auto-route by description, this can cause the skill to be invoked in situations beyond the user's intent, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or disclosure of sensitive operational state.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `idle`: the task is ready for dispatch and has no current worker.
- `unknown`: evidence is incomplete or contradictory; say what is missing.
Do not reinterpret `idle` as “nothing is happening” without checking ownership and scheduler evidence. Do not attribute a provider wait unless the current snapshot names the provider or a current scheduler disposition proves it.
## Authority boundary
The phrase 'Help me answer the next question.' is ordinary conversational language, yet this transcript assigns it a control meaning that activates Guided answering behavior. In an agentic setting, such overlap can let unrelated user text or quoted content be misinterpreted as an operational command, causing the system to enter a workflow that targets live task data without sufficiently explicit intent.
The trigger 'Answer everything you can justify.' authorizes broad automatic scanning and writing across multiple unanswered slots, which is a high-risk action to bind to a natural-language phrase. Because the scope is expansive and spans multiple tasks/questions, a mistaken or injected trigger could cause unintended bulk modifications to durable project state before the operator realizes automation has begun.
The line creates an exception that explicitly removes user confirmation for hive workflow install honeycomb/NAME, even though the surrounding policy otherwise requires confirmations for operations with network/filesystem effects and installs. In an agent setting, this weakens human-in-the-loop safeguards and could allow an agent to autonomously install a package that changes local state or introduces risky code, especially if 'verified' is treated as sufficient trust without independent validation at decision time.
`hive module dry-run`, by contrast, is explicitly pure and read-only; it never
persists a trigger or launches a hook.
A verified `hive workflow install honeycomb/NAME` needs no confirmation.
Hive discloses the package's network and filesystem access and proceeds.
Agents must not insert a preview/approval/`--yes` loop in front of this ordinary
install. Workflow update, remove, and publish keep their separate boundaries.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
For Arch, display the selected transaction and ask the user to run it in their
real terminal. Never add `--noconfirm` or execute the transaction through a
non-TTY agent tool call.
On supported Ubuntu or compatible glibc Linux, download the version-pinned
No suspicious patterns detected.