T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
proxy-and-local-dev.md:11- Finding
Unpinned Executable Development Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
proxy-and-local-dev.md, lines 11-17
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown Whop documents the proxy package as `@whop-apps/dev-proxy`. ```bash pnpm add -D @whop-apps/dev-proxy npm install --save-dev @whop-apps/dev-proxy yarn add -D @whop-apps/dev-proxy bun add -d @whop-apps/dev-proxytext ### Technical Analysis The documented commands install `@whop-apps/dev-proxy` without an exact version or explicit integrity constraint. Each package manager can therefore resolve a package release that differs from the release available when the Skill was audited. Third-party package installation is an executable supply-chain boundary. Package managers may run lifecycle scripts during installation, and the installed CLI is later executed as `whop-proxy`. If the publisher account, registry package, or release process were compromised, a malicious future release could execute code in the developer environment. Describing the package as official does not eliminate this mutable dependency risk. No evidence indicates that the package is currently malicious; the vulnerability is the unsafe, non-reproducible installation guidance. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, registry entry, or release pipeline for `@whop-apps/dev-proxy`. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that becomes the default version resolved by package managers. 3. A user follows one of the documented installation commands. 4. The package manager downloads the compromised release and may execute malicious lifecycle scripts during installation. 5. The user subsequently runs `whop-proxy`, providing another opportunity for the compromised package to execute. 6. The malicious code runs with the privileges of the developer account and can access resources available to that account. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could prov ...[truncated 592 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Replace the unversioned package reference with an exact, reviewed version in every supported command, for example:
bash npm install --save-dev --save-exact @whop-apps/dev-proxy@REVIEWED_VERSION -
Commit the relevant lockfile and require reproducible installation in automation:
npm cipnpm install --frozen-lockfileyarn install --immutablebun install --frozen-lockfile
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Verify package provenance, publisher identity, registry source, and integrity metadata before approving version updates.
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Review dependency changes and lifecycle scripts whenever the pinned version is upgraded.
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Consider performing the initial dependency review with lifecycle scripts disabled, where operationally practical, before permitting package scripts to execute.
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Configure the package manager to use the expected trusted registry and prevent unintended registry substitution or dependency-confusion paths.
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