T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
tapo-capture.py:20- Finding
Unrestricted Camera Host May Receive Sensitive Authentication Material
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
tapo-capture.py:20-128
Vulnerability Type: Unvalidated destination for credential-bearing authentication
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python parser.add_argument("--host", required=True, help="Camera hostname or IP")python username = os.getenv("TAPO_CAMERA_USERNAME") password = os.getenv("TAPO_CAMERA_PASSWORD") credentials_hash = os.getenv("KASA_CREDENTIALS_HASH") if credentials_hash and (username or password): raise SystemExit( "Use either TAPO_CAMERA_USERNAME/TAPO_CAMERA_PASSWORD or KASA_CREDENTIALS_HASH, not both." ) if username or password: if not username or not password: raise SystemExit( "Both TAPO_CAMERA_USERNAME and TAPO_CAMERA_PASSWORD are required together." ) credentials = Credentials(username=username, password=password) else: credentials = Nonepython return DeviceConfig( host=host, timeout=timeout, credentials=credentials, credentials_hash=credentials_hash, connection_type=camera_connection, )python config = build_config(args.host, args.timeout) dev = await Device.connect(config=config)Technical Analysis
The mandatory
--hostargument is accepted without validating that it identifies a user-approved camera on the trusted local network. The value is inserted directly into aDeviceConfigalongside either the camera username and password orKASA_CREDENTIALS_HASH, after whichpython-kasainitiates authentication with the selected destination.This implementation does not enforce the LAN-only boundary documented elsewhere in the project. It does not:
- Resolve and classify the supplied address before authentication.
- Reject public, unspecified, multicast, loopback, or otherwise unauthorized destinations.
- Compare the destination against an allowlist of approved camera addresses.
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- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
-
Resolve and validate the destination before loading or using credentials.
- Resolve the supplied hostname with
socket.getaddrinfo. - Parse every result with Python's
ipaddressmodule. - Require the address to belong to an explicitly approved LAN subnet rather than relying only on
is_private. - Reject public, unspecified, multicast, reserved, and loopback addresses. Handle link-local addresses only through a documented, explicit exception.
- Resolve the supplied hostname with
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Use an explicit camera allowlist.
- Store user-approved camera IP addresses or stable device identifiers without credentials.
- Require confirmation before adding a new destination.
- Refuse credential-bearing connections to hosts absent from the allowlist.
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Mitigate DNS rebinding and time-of-check/time-of-use issues.
- Resolve the hostname once.
- Validate the resolved address.
- Connect to the validated address or otherwise pin resolution for the connection.
- If hostname-based TLS verification is required, bind the validated IP and expected hostname securely rather than performing an independent second lookup.
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Validate before reading secrets where practical.
- Complete destination authorization before retrieving credentials from environment variables or a secret manager.
- Keep secrets scoped to the shortest possible execution period.
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Fail closed on ambiguous resolution.
- Reject hostnames that resolve to a mixture of approved and unapproved addresses.
- Report the resolved address without printing credentials or authenticated URLs.
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Add security regression tests.
- Confirm that approved RFC1918 camera addresses are accepted only when they are in configured LAN ranges.
- Confirm that public IP addresses, loopback, multicast, unspecified addresses, mixed DNS results, and rebinding-style resolution changes are rejected before
Device.connect()is called.
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