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Security audit

Domain Registration

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a clearly scoped domain-registration helper that uses expected registrar APIs and local operational notes, with explicit approval gates for billing and ownership changes.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent assist with registrar and DNS workflows. Require explicit confirmation for purchases, transfers, auto-renew changes, WHOIS/contact writes, and DNS changes, and keep registrar credentials outside the skill's memory files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
| Dynadot | Public API (`api.dynadot.com`) | `dynadot.com` | API key | Good fit for scripted portfolio operations |
| Porkbun | Public JSON API (`porkbun.com/api/json/v3`) | `porkbun.com` | API key + secret | API-first for registration and DNS operations |
| Name.com | Public REST API (`api.name.com`) | `name.com` | API token / basic auth | Supports registration, transfer, and DNS workflows |
| Gandi | Public v5 API (`api.gandi.net`) | `gandi.net` | Personal access token | EU-focused registrar with API coverage |
| OVHcloud Domains | Public API (`api.ovh.com`) | `www.ovh.com/manager` | API key + app key + app secret | Strong regional support and signed API pattern |
| OpenSRS / Enom | Reseller APIs (`api.opensrs.com`, provider-specific endpoints) | Reseller panels | Reseller credentials | Useful for agencies and wholesale portfolios |
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
|----------|-----------|---------|
| https://api.godaddy.com | Domain queries, registration and management payloads | GoDaddy API lifecycle operations |
| https://sso.godaddy.com | Authenticated account actions | GoDaddy dashboard operations |
| https://api.namecheap.com/xml.response | Domain and DNS XML parameters | Namecheap API actions |
| https://ap.www.namecheap.com | Account and billing interactions | Namecheap dashboard operations |
| https://route53domains.us-east-1.amazonaws.com | Domain lifecycle API payloads via AWS signatures | Route 53 Domains automation |
| https://console.aws.amazon.com | Account and domain dashboard actions | AWS console execution and validation |
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Generic pattern (provider-specific endpoint and fields required)
curl -sS -X POST "${PROVIDER_API}" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${PROVIDER_TOKEN}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"domain":"example.com","years":1,"privacy":true}'
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.