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Security audit

CPO / Chief Product Officer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown-only product leadership skill with coherent business advice and no executable behavior, though users should apply least-privilege controls to any customer data sharing.

Before installing, treat this as strategic CPO guidance rather than an authorization policy. If you use its hiring or onboarding advice, grant customer data access only when needed, approved, audited, and scoped to the new leader's role.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The 'When to Use' section says the skill applies when a user wants product leadership for their company, startup, or project, which is a very broad condition that could overlap with many general product or business questions. It does not define specific trigger phrases, scope boundaries, or negative examples to clarify when this skill should activate versus related skills.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The transition plan explicitly recommends giving a new CPO 'full access to customer data, research, metrics' without any qualification for least-privilege access, privacy controls, or role-based approval. In a real organization, this can normalize overbroad access to sensitive customer information and increase the risk of privacy violations, insider misuse, or unnecessary exposure of regulated data.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.