Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This content-marketing skill is a local, consent-based planning helper with no supported evidence of external data transmission or hidden execution.
Before installing, decide whether you want a local ~/content-marketing/ folder containing strategy, voice preferences, calendar entries, and content ideas. Use it only if you are comfortable with that local persistence, and delete the folder later if you want to remove the saved content-marketing memory.
Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.
- Content ideas in `~/content-marketing/content-bank/`
**This skill does NOT:**
- Send data to external services
- Access files outside `~/content-marketing/`
- Create files without explicit user permission
- Collect or transmit analytics
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- Content ideas in `~/content-marketing/content-bank/`
**This skill does NOT:**
- Send data to external services
- Access files outside `~/content-marketing/`
- Create files without explicit user permission
- Collect or transmit analytics
The template instructs ongoing collection of conversation-derived information into a persistent memory file, including goals, audience, channels, and evolving context. This creates a durable user profile without any stated consent, minimization, sensitivity checks, or deletion controls, increasing privacy and surveillance risk over time.
The file tells the agent to infer voice traits from the user's existing content and feedback and persist them, which amounts to building a behavioral/profile model from interactions. Inference-based profiling is more dangerous than storing explicit user input because it can encode assumptions the user never knowingly provided or approved.
The 'Internal observations' and performance notes sections encourage silent logging of subjective observations about the user and what is or is not working. This is dangerous because it invites unreviewed background profiling and potentially sensitive annotations that the user may not realize are being retained.
The skill explicitly instructs creation and continued maintenance of a memory file under the user's home directory, but provides no notice, consent step, or retention boundaries for persistent local storage. This is risky because it can silently accumulate user-related data across sessions in a location the user may not expect the agent to write to.
The editorial calendar template directs the agent to create a second persistent file in the user's home directory without warning that local files will be written and updated over time. Even if the content is business-oriented, silent persistence can surprise users and create unwanted local artifacts or disclosure risk on shared systems.
No suspicious patterns detected.