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Security audit

App Store

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only app publishing skill whose sensitive topics are expected for App Store and Play Console workflows.

Before using the automation examples, confirm release lanes are manually approved and protect App Store Connect and Google Play credentials in CI secrets. The skill itself is documentation-only, but copied release commands can affect production apps.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
| App ID | Unique identifier (bundle ID) | App Store Connect | Never |

**When Xcode says "No signing identity":**
1. Check certificate exists in Keychain Access (login keychain)
2. Check provisioning profile includes that certificate
3. Check bundle ID in Xcode matches App ID exactly
4. Revoke and recreate if nothing else works
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The markdown includes a release lane that submits an app for review and enables automatic release, which can directly publish software to users. Although this is CI/CD-related content, the document does not explicitly warn readers that these settings may trigger production release without further manual approval.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Generate JWT (required for all requests)
JWT=$(generate_jwt --issuer $ISSUER_ID --key-id $KEY_ID --private-key key.p8)
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" https://api.appstoreconnect.apple.com/v1/apps
```

### Common operations
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
### Common issues
- "Build processing" stuck: Wait, or contact Apple Developer Support
- "Missing compliance": Add export compliance key to Info.plist
- Testers not receiving invite: Check spam, verify email, resend

---
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
### Common issues
- "Build processing" stuck: Wait, or contact Apple Developer Support
- "Missing compliance": Add export compliance key to Info.plist
- Testers not receiving invite: Check spam, verify email, resend

---
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.