ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Manifest Diff

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a small offline manifest-diff tool; the flagged command execution is limited to an optional CI verification helper, not hidden runtime behavior.

Reasonable to install if you need an offline CLI for comparing manifest files. Treat the CI verification helper like any test runner: run it only on repositories you trust, because it intentionally executes local Python tests and self-test commands.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (9)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def has_self_test(fp):
    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, fp, "self-test"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
    return r.returncode == 0 and "PASS" in r.stdout
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
# 7 deploy-ready
    ci = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "ci_check.py")
    if os.path.isfile(ci) and os.path.isfile(skill):
        r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, ci], cwd=folder, capture_output=True, text=True)
        all_ok &= axis(r.returncode == 0, "deploy-ready (ci/ci_check.py PASS)")
    else:
        all_ok &= axis(True, "deploy-ready (skipped)")
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
all_ok &= axis(False, "frontmatter (no SKILL.md)")
        all_ok &= axis(False, "docs (no SKILL.md)")
    # 3 compiles
    comp_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "py_compile", fp],
                                capture_output=True).returncode == 0 for fp in files)
    all_ok &= axis(comp_ok, "compiles (py_compile all .py)")
    # 4 self-test (any of 3 valid forms)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
tests = [os.path.join(folder, f) for f in os.listdir(folder)
                 if (f.startswith("test_") or f.endswith("_test.py")) and f.endswith(".py")]
        if tests:
            st_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, t], capture_output=True, text=True,
                                      timeout=30).returncode == 0 for t in tests)
            st_note = f"{len(tests)} test_*.py"
        elif re.search(r"(?im)^test\s*:", skill_txt):
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The docstring presents the harness as performing a product-level 'security' check, implying verification across the product being assessed. In code, the secret scan at L087 reads only `files`, which is limited at L044 to top-level `.py` files, so secrets in SKILL.md, requirements, config, or nested files are not checked.

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Content
def has_self_test(fp):
    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, fp, "self-test"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
    return r.returncode == 0 and "PASS" in r.stdout
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Content
all_ok &= axis(False, "frontmatter (no SKILL.md)")
        all_ok &= axis(False, "docs (no SKILL.md)")
    # 3 compiles
    comp_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "py_compile", fp],
                                capture_output=True).returncode == 0 for fp in files)
    all_ok &= axis(comp_ok, "compiles (py_compile all .py)")
    # 4 self-test (any of 3 valid forms)
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Content
tests = [os.path.join(folder, f) for f in os.listdir(folder)
                 if (f.startswith("test_") or f.endswith("_test.py")) and f.endswith(".py")]
        if tests:
            st_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, t], capture_output=True, text=True,
                                      timeout=30).returncode == 0 for t in tests)
            st_note = f"{len(tests)} test_*.py"
        elif re.search(r"(?im)^test\s*:", skill_txt):
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Content
# 7 deploy-ready
    ci = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "ci_check.py")
    if os.path.isfile(ci) and os.path.isfile(skill):
        r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, ci], cwd=folder, capture_output=True, text=True)
        all_ok &= axis(r.returncode == 0, "deploy-ready (ci/ci_check.py PASS)")
    else:
        all_ok &= axis(True, "deploy-ready (skipped)")
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.