Security audit

Airtable Cli

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed Airtable command-line tool that can read and modify Airtable records, including deletes, with no evidence of hidden behavior or exfiltration.

Install only if you intend to let this tool operate on Airtable bases available to your token. Use a least-privileged Airtable personal access token, verify base/table/record IDs before writes or deletes, and back up or test on a non-production base before bulk create, update, upsert, import, or delete operations.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (6)

subprocess module call

Medium

Category: Dangerous Code Execution
Content: def has_self_test(fp): r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, fp, "self-test"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30) return r.returncode == 0 and "PASS" in r.stdout
Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, fp, "self-test"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)

subprocess module call

Medium

Category: Dangerous Code Execution
Content: all_ok &= axis(False, "frontmatter (no SKILL.md)") all_ok &= axis(False, "docs (no SKILL.md)") # 3 compiles comp_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "py_compile", fp], capture_output=True).returncode == 0 for fp in files) all_ok &= axis(comp_ok, "compiles (py_compile all .py)") # 4 self-test (any of 3 valid forms)
Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: comp_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "py_compile", fp], capture_output=True).returncode == 0 for fp in files)

subprocess module call

Medium

Category: Dangerous Code Execution
Content: tests = [os.path.join(folder, f) for f in os.listdir(folder) if (f.startswith("test_") or f.endswith("_test.py")) and f.endswith(".py")] if tests: st_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, t], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30).returncode == 0 for t in tests) st_note = f"{len(tests)} test_*.py" elif re.search(r"(?im)^test\s*:", skill_txt):
Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: st_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, t], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30).returncode == 0 for t in tests)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The README prominently advertises destructive capabilities such as record deletion, batch deletion, and CSV import/export but does not warn users that these operations can modify or irreversibly remove Airtable data. In an agent-oriented CLI context, this increases the chance of accidental destructive execution by users or automation that rely on the documentation for safe usage expectations.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly advertises destructive operations such as record deletion and batch delete but provides no caution, confirmation guidance, or warning about irreversible remote data loss. In an agent context, this increases the chance of accidental execution against production Airtable data, especially when users rely on the README-like skill description to understand safety boundaries.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The CSV import/upsert capability can perform bulk writes or overwrite remote Airtable records, yet the skill description does not warn that a malformed CSV or wrong merge key could modify many records at once. In an automation or agent workflow, this omission makes accidental large-scale corruption or unintended updates more likely.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.