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Security audit

Aha Opencode Omo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a transparent OpenCode/OMO orchestration guide with no bundled executable payload, though its upgrade instructions rely on mutable remote sources.

Before installing or upgrading, review the repository contents and prefer a pinned commit or signed release instead of blindly fetching the latest version. Expect the skill to guide agent delegation and capability discovery, including subagents or worktrees for larger tasks, while preserving confirmation and secret-handling boundaries.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:63
Finding

Unpinned Remote Upgrade and Installation Sources

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 63
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from mutable remote dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
- **Upgrade**: Run `git pull` in the aha-orch repo, or re-run `npx skills add its-how/aha-orch` to get the latest version.

Technical Analysis

The documented upgrade mechanisms retrieve mutable remote content without pinning a package version, repository commit, signed release, or integrity hash.

Running git pull implicitly trusts the repository's current upstream branch. Likewise, npx skills add its-how/aha-orch may involve an unpinned package runner and installs the latest content associated with a mutable repository reference. Consequently, the installed material may differ from the version reviewed during this audit.

An attacker who compromises the upstream repository, package distribution channel, maintainer credentials, or referenced branch could replace the reviewed Skill content with malicious instructions or supporting files. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently reviewed files are malicious.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, publishing account, maintainer credentials, or dependency distribution channel.
  2. The attacker modifies the mutable branch or package content referenced by the documented upgrade command.
  3. A user follows the instructions and runs git pull or npx skills add its-how/aha-orch.
  4. The unverified remote content replaces or augments the audited Skill files.
  5. OpenCode subsequently loads the attacker-controlled Skill instructions.
  6. The altered version may direct the agent to execute unsafe commands, expose accessible data, misuse tools, or weaken permission and confirmation controls.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation can modify the effective instructions and files loaded by the agent under the permissions of the user running the installat ...[truncated 402 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace mutable repository references with an immutable commit hash or a cryptographically signed release tag.
  2. Pin the package runner and installer to reviewed versions instead of relying on the latest version resolved by npx.
  3. Publish cryptographic checksums for release artifacts and verify them before installation.
  4. Prefer a reproducible installation command that identifies both the installer version and the exact Skill release.
  5. Require users to inspect the downloaded diff before activating an upgrade.
  6. Protect releases with signed commits or tags, multifactor authentication, branch protection, and restricted publishing credentials.
  7. Document a rollback procedure to restore the previously verified release if integrity validation fails.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends npx skills add its-how/aha-orch without pinning a specific package version or immutable source revision. This can cause users to fetch and execute newer, potentially compromised code at install time, turning documentation into a supply-chain execution path if the upstream package or dependency chain is hijacked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.