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Security audit

Ts Sdk Address

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Aptos TypeScript SDK address-format guide with no executable behavior or hidden high-impact authority.

This appears safe to install as documentation-only SDK guidance. Reviewers may still want to trim the wide Markdown table for readability, but it does not create a security concern in this artifact.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 197)May include surrounding context.

md
## Common mistakes

| Mistake                               | Correct approach                                                                                              |
| ------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Using `Hex` for account address       | Use `AccountAddress` only                                                                                     |
| Comparing with `===` on strings       | Use `addr1.equals(addr2)` or compare after `AccountAddress.from()`                                            |

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 199)May include surrounding context.

md
| Mistake                               | Correct approach                                                                                              |
| ------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Using `Hex` for account address       | Use `AccountAddress` only                                                                                     |
| Comparing with `===` on strings       | Use `addr1.equals(addr2)` or compare after `AccountAddress.from()`                                            |
| Using SHORT for non-special in strict | Use LONG (0x + 64 hex chars) or `AccountAddress.from()` (relaxed)                                             |
| Hand-rolling object address hash      | Use `createObjectAddress` / `createTokenAddress` / `createResourceAddress` / `createUserDerivedObjectAddress` |

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.