T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- README.md:25
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Installer Executed Directly by a Shell## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md:25` **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: Critical ```bash curl -fsSL https://skillhub.cn/cli | sh ``` ### Technical Analysis This command retrieves content from an external URL and immediately passes it to a shell. The downloaded payload is not included in the audited package and can change independently after the Skill has been reviewed. There is no version pinning, cryptographic signature validation, checksum verification, or opportunity to inspect the script before execution. HTTPS protects the connection in transit but does not establish that the current or future response is safe. Compromise of the website, hosting environment, DNS resolution, certificate issuance process, or release pipeline could cause arbitrary shell commands to be delivered. Direct remote shell execution exceeds the minimum privileges required by the declared financial-analysis functionality. The Skill itself is a static HTML-based analyzer, and publishing its package does not inherently require executing an unaudited remote script. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `skillhub.cn` server, its deployment pipeline, or another part of the script-delivery infrastructure. 2. The attacker modifies the response returned from `https://skillhub.cn/cli`. 3. A user follows the README installation instructions. 4. `curl` retrieves the modified response. 5. The pipe sends the response directly to `sh` without verification or review. 6. The malicious commands execute with all privileges available to the user who invoked the command. ### Impact Assessment The remote payload can execute arbitrary commands under the invoking account. It could read or modify accessible files, steal credentials and API tokens, alter shell configuration, install persistence, download additional payloads, or tamper with projects and published Skill packages. If the co ...[truncated 273 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the `curl | sh` installation instruction. 2. Distribute the CLI through a trusted package registry using a fixed, documented version. 3. If a standalone installer is necessary, instruct users to download a versioned artifact separately rather than piping it into a shell. 4. Publish a cryptographic checksum and a signature through an independent trusted channel. 5. Require users to verify both the checksum and signature before execution. 6. Make the installer source available for inspection and document the files, commands, network destinations, and permissions it uses. 7. Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a specific privileged operation is strictly necessary. 8. Avoid requesting `sudo` for the complete installer; isolate and document any operation that genuinely requires elevation.