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Security audit

Stock Screener

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward stock-screener API helper with disclosed network use and a minor packaging risk from an unpinned Python dependency.

Install only if you are comfortable querying Intellectia's API for stock screener data. Use an isolated Python environment where possible, consider pinning requests before installation, and treat the returned market predictions as informational rather than financial advice.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:4
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependency<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 4 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency and supply-chain risk **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```json metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"bins":["curl","python3"]},"install":[{"id":"python","kind":"pip","package":"requests","bins":[],"label":"Install requests (pip)"}]}} ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation metadata requests the `requests` package by name without specifying an exact version, locking its transitive dependencies, or providing integrity hashes. Consequently, the installed code is selected by the package resolver at installation time rather than being identical to a dependency version reviewed with this Skill. This creates a supply-chain exposure: a compromised package release, compromised transitive dependency, unsafe package-index configuration, dependency substitution, or future incompatible release could introduce attacker-controlled code or unexpected behavior. The project contains no evidence that `requests` is currently malicious; the vulnerability is the absence of controls ensuring that the installed dependency is the reviewed dependency. ### Attack Path 1. A user or automated Skill installer processes the installation metadata in `SKILL.md`. 2. The installer invokes pip to resolve `requests` without a version or hash constraint. 3. Pip consults its configured package index and dynamically selects a release of `requests` and its transitive dependencies. 4. If the index, selected release, dependency, or local pip configuration has been compromised, attacker-controlled package content is downloaded. 5. Malicious package behavior can execute during installation or when the Skill imports and uses the package. 6. The code runs with the permissions of the user or service account performing the installation or invoking the Skill. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code within the Python installatio ...[truncated 505 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Prefer eliminating the external dependency by using Python's standard-library HTTP client where practical. 2. If `requests` is retained, pin it to an explicitly reviewed version, such as an exact `==` constraint. 3. Lock every transitive dependency rather than relying on installation-time resolution. 4. Require cryptographic hashes for all locked packages, for example through a hash-locked requirements file and pip's `--require-hashes` option. 5. Install packages only from an approved HTTPS package index; disable untrusted supplemental indexes. 6. Periodically review and deliberately update the lock file after vulnerability and compatibility testing. 7. Install the dependency inside an isolated, least-privileged virtual environment or container rather than a system-wide Python environment. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
- `GET /gateway/v1/stock/screener-list`

Full URL:
- `https://api.intellectia.ai/gateway/v1/stock/screener-list`

## Query parameters
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
- `GET /gateway/v1/stock/screener-list`

Full URL:
- `https://api.intellectia.ai/gateway/v1/stock/screener-list`

## Query parameters
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.