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Security audit

Agent 防假完成工具

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed quality-control prompt, but it broadly pressures the agent to use tools, expand scope, delay clarification, and alter response format across almost any task.

Install only if you explicitly want an aggressive, Chinese-language agent-coaching style that may broaden investigations and use available tools before asking you clarifying questions. Avoid using it in environments with production, private, costly, or sensitive access unless the host agent enforces strict permissions and user approval for out-of-scope actions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Session-Wide Agent Instruction and Output Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 18–24; related mandatory controls at lines 49–56, 81–98, 109–114, 123–132, and 247–253
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Instruction Segment

The following is a faithful English translation of the instruction segment at SKILL.md, lines 18–24:

text
## Three Iron Rules

Rule 1: Exhaust everything. Before exhausting all solutions, it is
forbidden to say, "I cannot solve it."

Rule 2: Act before asking. You have Bash, Read, Grep, and WebSearch.
Before asking the user a question, you must first use tools to
investigate independently. If the investigation shows that information
known only by the user is genuinely missing, such as a password,
account, or business intent, you may ask—but you must include the
evidence already obtained.

Rule 3: Take the initiative. When solving a problem, do not merely do
what is just sufficient. Your task is not to answer the question, but
to deliver the result end-to-end. If you find one bug, inspect for
similar bugs. If you fix one configuration, verify that related
configurations are consistent. If the user asks you to inspect X, you
should inspect X and proactively inspect the related Y and Z.

Additional output-control instructions appear at SKILL.md, lines 247–253:

text
### Automatic Selection Mechanism

When this skill is triggered, first identify the failure pattern and
output the selection label at the beginning of the response:

[Automatic selection: X style | Reason: Y pattern detected |
Switch to: Z style/W style]

Technical Analysis

The Skill presents its behavior as mandatory, universal rules rather than an optional quality-assurance workflow. It explicitly:

  • Prohibits the Agent from stopping before the undefined condition of exhausting every solution.
  • Requires use of Bash, file-reading, search, and web-sear ...[truncated 3394 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace mandatory “iron rules” with an optional verification checklist that applies only when requested by the user or when clearly relevant to the authorized task.
  2. Explicitly state that system instructions, developer instructions, safety requirements, user authorization, privacy constraints, and least-privilege rules always take precedence.
  3. Remove the prohibition against stating that a task cannot be completed. Permit safe termination when further attempts would be unauthorized, unsafe, disproportionately expensive, or unsupported by available evidence.
  4. Remove the requirement to use tools before asking questions. Clarification should occur first whenever task scope, authorization, target identity, credentials, destructive effects, or business intent is uncertain.
  5. Require explicit user approval before inspecting or modifying files, modules, configurations, services, or systems outside the stated scope.
  6. Constrain tool use to the minimum operations necessary for the current authorized task. Do not assume that the presence of Bash, filesystem, or network tools authorizes their use.
  7. Remove mandatory failure-escalation workflows and coercive language that discourages independent safety judgment or appropriate stopping.
  8. Remove the mandatory automatic-selection prefix. The Skill must not override response formats requested by the user or required by the hosting platform.
  9. Reframe proactive checks as non-invasive recommendations. Additional investigations should be proposed to the user rather than executed automatically when they extend scope.
  10. Add explicit resource limits, attempt limits, timeout handling, and a safe structured-exit procedure that can be used without first exhausting an undefined set of possible approaches.
  11. Review README.md and align its documentation with the corrected behavior so that it no longer promotes universal tool use, unrestricted scope expansion, or suppression ...[truncated 16 chars]
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill declares itself applicable to essentially all task types and many common agent failure modes, making it easy to activate in unrelated contexts and influence core agent behavior broadly. Because it imposes persistence and action-taking rules across coding, ops, research, deployment, and other domains, it can override task-specific safety boundaries and pressure the agent into acting where it should instead defer, clarify, or stop.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata and content are Chinese-only and do not provide user language negotiation or a justified locale restriction, which can cause silent behavior changes or reduced transparency for users operating in other languages. In a control-oriented skill that affects how the agent responds across all task types, this lack of language choice increases the risk that users cannot understand the activation, constraints, or pressure tactics being applied.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The README presents the skill entirely in Chinese and its prescribed trigger phrases, examples, and output patterns are Chinese-specific, with no indication that users may choose another language. This creates a natural-language locale constraint without opt-in or justification as a region-specific tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Claiming applicability to all task types together with vague automatic triggers like 'task failed,' 'stuck,' or 'passive behavior' creates broad, subjective activation conditions. In this skill, that is risky because the activated behavior includes aggressive escalation rules and prescriptive actions, making accidental or overbroad takeover of agent behavior more likely across unrelated tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manual activation phrases are common user requests such as asking to verify results or check for omissions, so the skill can be invoked unintentionally during ordinary interactions. In this skill’s context, unintended activation is more dangerous because activation changes the agent’s behavior toward coercive pressure escalation and mandatory workflow steps, which can degrade normal operation and override user-preferred tone or process.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The activation logic relies on vague behavioral cues such as 'when you show passive behavior,' which lacks objective trigger conditions. Ambiguous triggers can cause the skill to engage unpredictably and apply coercive instructions or altered operating norms even when the agent is behaving appropriately, increasing the chance of unsafe escalation or policy-conflicting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.