T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- pyproject.toml:13
- Finding
- Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Resolution Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `pyproject.toml:1-3, 13` **Vulnerability Type**: Unbounded third-party package versions **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```toml [build-system] requires = ["hatchling"] build-backend = "hatchling.build" ``` ```toml dependencies = ["mcp>=1.0", "infoway-sdk>=0.1.0"] ``` ### Technical Analysis The project does not constrain its build dependency to a reviewed version, while its runtime dependencies use only minimum-version constraints. Consequently, a fresh `pip install` or the documented `uvx infoway-mcp-server` invocation may resolve and execute dependency versions published after this project was audited. Python build backends and package installation processes execute code with the privileges of the installing user. The runtime application also imports and invokes the resolved packages: ```python from mcp.server import Server from mcp.server.stdio import stdio_server from mcp.types import Tool, TextContent from infoway import InfowayClient ``` This is not evidence that the currently named packages are malicious. It is a supply-chain control weakness: compromise of a dependency publisher account, malicious future release, or upstream package takeover could change the code installed and executed without requiring any modification to this repository. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publishing channel or maintainer account of `hatchling`, `mcp`, `infoway-sdk`, or a transitive dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version satisfying the unconstrained requirement or the relevant `>=` lower bound. 3. A user performs a fresh installation using `pip` or launches the package through the documented `uvx` command. 4. The package resolver selects the new malicious release because no reviewed upper bound, lock file, or hash constraint prevents it. 5. Malicious build or import-time code executes with the privileges of the ...[truncated 882 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin direct runtime and build dependencies to exact, reviewed versions rather than unconstrained or minimum-only specifications. 2. Maintain a lock or constraints file that also records resolved transitive dependency versions. 3. Use hash-verified installation, such as `pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt`, for reproducible deployments. 4. Separate broad compatibility declarations used for library publication from a fully pinned constraints file used for MCP server deployment. 5. Configure automated dependency scanning and update tooling, but require review and testing before accepting new versions. 6. Generate and retain a software bill of materials for releases and verify packages against trusted package indexes. 7. Avoid installing or running the server with elevated privileges. Execute it under a dedicated, least-privileged account with access only to the required API credential. 8. Pin the package version in documented `uvx` examples so routine launches do not silently adopt a newly published release.