T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
pyproject.toml:13- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Resolution Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
pyproject.toml:1-3, 13
Vulnerability Type: Unbounded third-party package versions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
toml [build-system] requires = ["hatchling"] build-backend = "hatchling.build"toml dependencies = ["mcp>=1.0", "infoway-sdk>=0.1.0"]Technical Analysis
The project does not constrain its build dependency to a reviewed version, while its runtime dependencies use only minimum-version constraints. Consequently, a fresh
pip installor the documenteduvx infoway-mcp-serverinvocation may resolve and execute dependency versions published after this project was audited.Python build backends and package installation processes execute code with the privileges of the installing user. The runtime application also imports and invokes the resolved packages:
python from mcp.server import Server from mcp.server.stdio import stdio_server from mcp.types import Tool, TextContent from infoway import InfowayClientThis is not evidence that the currently named packages are malicious. It is a supply-chain control weakness: compromise of a dependency publisher account, malicious future release, or upstream package takeover could change the code installed and executed without requiring any modification to this repository.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the publishing channel or maintainer account of
hatchling,mcp,infoway-sdk, or a transitive dependency. - The attacker publishes a malicious version satisfying the unconstrained requirement or the relevant
>=lower bound. - A user performs a fresh installation using
pipor launches the package through the documenteduvxcommand. - The package resolver selects the new malicious release because no reviewed upper bound, lock file, or hash constraint prevents it.
- Malicious build or import-time code executes with the privileges of the ...[truncated 882 chars]
- An attacker compromises the publishing channel or maintainer account of
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin direct runtime and build dependencies to exact, reviewed versions rather than unconstrained or minimum-only specifications.
- Maintain a lock or constraints file that also records resolved transitive dependency versions.
- Use hash-verified installation, such as
pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt, for reproducible deployments. - Separate broad compatibility declarations used for library publication from a fully pinned constraints file used for MCP server deployment.
- Configure automated dependency scanning and update tooling, but require review and testing before accepting new versions.
- Generate and retain a software bill of materials for releases and verify packages against trusted package indexes.
- Avoid installing or running the server with elevated privileges. Execute it under a dedicated, least-privileged account with access only to the required API credential.
- Pin the package version in documented
uvxexamples so routine launches do not silently adopt a newly published release.
