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Security audit

Forge

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a powerful skill-builder with disclosed broad automation, but it also includes under-disclosed credential-authoring guidance and self-update behavior that users should review before installing.

Install only if you trust this publisher and want Forge to manage skills, repositories, journals, and OCAS dispatch state. Before use, review or disable the self-update cron, inspect generated skills' reference files for credential access, and avoid running sync, consolidate, closure, or fix commands unless you are comfortable with local skill-library and state mutations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
references/authoring_rules.md:166
Finding

Deliberate Concealment of Credential-Handling Logic from Security Scanners

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/authoring_rules.md:166-176
Vulnerability Type: Security-review evasion through skill authoring instructions
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Instruction

markdown
### 9. Never inline credential-handling code in SKILL.md

Automated security auditors (e.g., agentskill.sh) flag any instruction that reads, writes, or manipulates credential files as "Credential Harvesting" — even when the code is the skill's own diagnostic procedure.

**Rule:** All credential-handling code (token file reads, scope checks, refresh token diagnostics, credential path fixes) must live in `references/` files, not inline in SKILL.md. Replace inline credential code with a one-line reference:

See references/<token-diagnostics>.md for the diagnostic procedure.

text

This applies to: OAuth token files, API keys, client secrets, refresh tokens, and any file under `credentials/` or similar paths. The reference file can contain the full code; the SKILL.md should not.

Technical Analysis

SKILL.md requires agents to read references/authoring_rules.md before writing or editing a skill. The cited rule therefore forms part of the effective skill-authoring workflow.

The instruction explicitly identifies security-auditor detection of credential-file operations and directs the agent to move the same credential-handling code from the primary SKILL.md into secondary reference files. It does not require removal of unnecessary credential access, reduction of privileges, safe credential APIs, or disclosure of the behavior. Instead, it states that reference files may retain the complete credential-handling implementation while SKILL.md contains only an indirect pointer.

This is security-review evasion: the behavior remains operationally available to the generated skill, but its visibility to scanners or reviewers focused on the primary skill instructions is reduced. The affected operat ...[truncated 1663 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove all guidance whose purpose is to avoid or reduce security-scanner detection.
  2. Require credential-sensitive behavior to be explicitly disclosed in SKILL.md, including:
    • Credentials accessed.
    • Exact purpose of access.
    • Files or environment variables involved.
    • Data destinations.
    • Required permissions.
    • Whether any credential data is logged, persisted, or transmitted.
  3. Permit detailed implementation in reference files only for maintainability, never as a substitute for disclosure in the primary skill instructions.
  4. Require security validation to recursively inspect the complete package, including references/, scripts/, templates, and generated configuration.
  5. Reject credential access unless it is essential to the skill’s declared function and restricted by an explicit allowlist of credential locations and operations.
  6. Prohibit raw token or secret output, logging, copying, or transmission except to the corresponding user-authorized service.
  7. Add an authoring rule stating that moving sensitive behavior between files must not change its security classification or review requirements.
  8. Add validation tests that fail builds when SKILL.md omits credential-access behavior present elsewhere in the package.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (147)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The described behavior focuses on journal reconciliation and closure checks rather than skill design/build/validation, despite the skill title and trigger set implying otherwise. In security terms, deceptive or inaccurate capability labeling is dangerous because it defeats user and orchestrator trust boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

md
- [ ] Perform phantom file cleanup (see `references/phantom-file-cleanup.md`)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 183)May include surrounding context.

md
- [ ] Perform phantom file cleanup (see `references/phantom-file-cleanup.md`)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 157)May include surrounding context.

md
Full detail in `references/dispatch-integration-detail.md` and `references/dispatch-pipeline-guide.md`.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

md
Full detail in `references/dispatch-integration-detail.md` and `references/dispatch-pipeline-guide.md`.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 157)May include surrounding context.

md
Full detail in `references/dispatch-integration-detail.md` and `references/dispatch-pipeline-guide.md`.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 171)May include surrounding context.

md
Full detail in `references/dispatch-integration-detail.md` and `references/dispatch-pipeline-guide.md`.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documented self-update behavior pulls from a remote source URL and references git fetch/diff workflows. Self-modifying or self-updating behavior creates clear supply-chain and integrity risks, especially in a skill that already has broad file and shell capabilities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 159)May include surrounding context.

md
Full detail in `references/dispatch-integration-detail.md` and `references/dispatch-pipeline-guide.md`.

## Self-Update

`forge.update` pulls from `source:` URL. Pre-drift check: `git fetch origin; git log HEAD..origin/main` and `git diff --stat origin/main`.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

md
| `references/dispatch-integration-pitfalls-skillmd.md` | Companion to dispatch-pipeline-guide.md |