T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:64- Finding
Autonomous Cross-Skill Access and Global Scheduler Modification
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed OpenClaw maintenance agent, but it requests broad persistent repair authority, automatic self-updates, cross-skill scheduler changes, and automatic external searches that need careful review.
Install only if you want an autonomous OpenClaw maintenance agent that can persist across sessions, modify scheduler state, initialize other skills, repair logs/configuration, and self-update from GitHub. Before enabling it, require opt-in background tasks, disable or approve each self-update, restrict cross-skill reads and task registration, sanitize or approve web-search queries, and ensure repair commands validate placeholders and paths.
SKILL.md:64Autonomous Cross-Skill Access and Global Scheduler Modification
references/known_issues.json:2Unvalidated Placeholder Interpolation in Autonomous Repair Commands
SKILL.md:177Potential Disclosure of Sensitive Log Content Through External Web Searches
A scheduled self-update mechanism from GitHub is a genuine self-modification capability because it allows the skill to replace or alter its own code on a recurring unattended basis. In the context of a tool that also registers tasks and performs automatic repairs, this meaningfully expands the blast radius of any repository compromise, dependency hijack, or logic bug into persistent autonomous execution.
|---|---|---|---|
| `custodian:light` | heartbeat | every heartbeat cycle | `custodian.scan.light` |
| `custodian:deep` | cron | optimized 6h (initial: `0 1,7,13,19 * * *` PT) | `custodian.scan.deep` |
| `custodian:update` | cron | `0 0 * * *` (midnight daily) | Self-update from GitHub source |
## Changelog
The description presents the skill as autonomously repairing failures during quiet hours, but does not clearly warn that it may modify cron registrations, create files/directories, rotate logs/JSONL, refresh tokens, adjust schedules, or perform external web searches. Omitting those disclosures is dangerous because users or orchestrators may grant it access under the mistaken belief that it is primarily observational.
The skill schedules a self-update from a GitHub source, which introduces a supply-chain and remote code change risk: future behavior can change without fresh user review. Combined with autonomous background execution, this can allow unreviewed updates to gain ongoing privileged influence over maintenance actions.
|---|---|---|---|
| `custodian:light` | heartbeat | every heartbeat cycle | `custodian.scan.light` |
| `custodian:deep` | cron | optimized 6h (initial: `0 1,7,13,19 * * *` PT) | `custodian.scan.deep` |
| `custodian:update` | cron | `0 0 * * *` (midnight daily) | Self-update from GitHub source |
Registration during `custodian.init` (idempotent -- check `openclaw cron list` first).
The opening description explicitly says the skill detects and repairs failures autonomously during quiet hours, but it presents this as a feature without a strong warning about unattended remediation. Autonomous repairs can alter system configuration, logs, task registration, or skill state without supervision, increasing the risk of unintended changes or abuse if repair logic is wrong or manipulated.
The README states that initialization runs automatically and creates directories, config files, background tasks, and copies a workflow plan, but it does not clearly warn users that invoking the skill changes system state. Hidden or under-emphasized automatic system modifications reduce informed consent and can lead users to install or invoke the skill without understanding that persistent scheduled execution will be registered.
The scheduled tasks table documents a nightly self-update from GitHub, but the README does not present this as a significant security-sensitive behavior. Automatic code updates from a remote source can introduce supply-chain compromise, unexpected behavior changes, or malicious updates without user review, especially when combined with background execution and repair authority.
The trigger phrases are broad and operationally generic, such as 'check system health' or 'fix log errors,' which could cause the skill to be invoked in contexts where the user did not intend autonomous repair behavior. Because this skill can register tasks, modify cron state, initialize skills, and perform repairs, accidental invocation materially raises the risk of unauthorized or surprising changes.
The skill is designed for persistence: it creates storage, registers recurring background tasks, writes journals, copies plans into another component's directory, and continuously re-runs maintenance logic. Persistent autonomous execution increases blast radius because any misconfiguration, unsafe repair rule, or compromised update can continue acting without immediate user awareness.
## Commands
- `custodian.init` -- create storage, register background tasks idempotently, copy bundled plan to Mentor plans dir, build initial activity model
- `custodian.scan.light` -- tail gateway log (last 100 lines), check cron registry, retry open `fix_attempted_failed` items, check for uninitialized skills, write Observation Journal
- `custodian.scan.deep` -- full sweep: all light steps + full JSONL scan, doctor diagnostic, journal health, skill conformance, skill init pass, activity model rebuild, schedule optimization, repair pass, web search pass, escalation pass, report, Vesper signal
- `custodian.verify {fix_id}` -- verify fix outcome, update record, escalate if failed twice
The skill claims a non-destructive, reversible safety envelope, but elsewhere explicitly directs state-changing actions such as rotating files, generating default configs, re-enabling cron jobs, registering tasks, and updating schedules. This mismatch can mislead users or downstream agents into authorizing autonomous modifications under a false assumption of harmlessness, increasing the chance of unintended system changes.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
"source": "doctor",
"auto_fix": null,
"reversibility": null,
"description": "systemd linger not enabled -- background services will not persist across logout",
"technology_context": "systemd loginctl linger"
},
"oc_node_version_mismatch": {
The skill advertises very broad trigger phrases such as 'check system health', 'why is X failing', and 'clean up errors', which are likely to match common user requests outside the intended scope. Because this skill is described as autonomously applying fixes, initializing skills, and registering background tasks, accidental invocation could lead to unintended operational changes rather than merely returning information.
This markdown file explicitly instructs the skill to write a proposal to ~/openclaw/data/ocas-custodian/reports/repair-{{params.issue_id}}.md, but it does not include any user-facing warning that the plan will create or overwrite a file on disk. Under the markdown criteria for SQP-2, behaviors affecting user data or system state should be disclosed in the skill description.