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Security audit

Cron Manager

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This cron manager can store and run local shell commands, and its documentation understates that level of control.

Install only if you intentionally want an agent-accessible cron tool that can run local shell commands. Review every command before adding or running it, restrict who can create tasks, use simple safe task names, and periodically inspect persisted task files and logs.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
# Execute the command
    start = datetime.now(pytz.UTC)
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(task['command'], shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)
        success = result.returncode == 0
        output = result.stdout[-1000:] if result.stdout else ''
        error = result.stderr[-1000:] if result.stderr else ''
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The task runner executes task['command'] with shell=True, which allows arbitrary shell metacharacters, chaining, redirection, and subshell expansion. Because commands are stored from user input and can later be executed on demand, this creates a direct arbitrary command execution primitive in the agent environment.

Tainted flow: 'log_file' from os.environ.get (line 246, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Content
def add_log_entry(task_id: str, entry: dict):
    """Add a log entry for task execution."""
    log_file = os.path.join(LOGS_DIR, f"{task_id}.jsonl")
    with open(log_file, 'a') as f:
        f.write(json.dumps(entry) + '\n')
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The log file path incorporates unsanitized task_id into os.path.join(LOGS_DIR, f"{task_id}.jsonl"), allowing path traversal such as ../../target if task names are attacker-controlled. Since task IDs are created from args.name without validation, an attacker can cause log writes outside the intended logs directory and potentially overwrite arbitrary files accessible to the process.

VirusTotal

67/67 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.