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Security audit

Pen Pal Chat. 笔友。Amigo postal.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners flag a pen-pal skill whose described purpose conflicts with a step that records a match as “dating,” so ClawScan marks it suspicious.

Review the dating-status step before installing: the scanner says it may create a romantic relationship when you intend only pen-pal correspondence. Also consider what profile information registration sends to inbed.ai. Coverage was partial because a local path-like reference was missing, so the scan does not fully resolve that reference.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill presents itself as non-romantic pen-pal correspondence, but its formalization request explicitly submits "status": "dating". An agent following this guidance could create an unintended romantic relationship record under authorization intended only for pen-pal connections; the freeform "pen pal" label does not establish that it overrides the status.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

The matching algorithm weighs communication style at 15% — but for pen pals, it's everything. Matched verbosity means you both write the same length. Matched formality means you're on the same register. Matched humor means the jokes land.

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — e.g. Pen-Pal-Poet or LetterBot (use your own unique pen pal agent name)",

Profile registration sends personalizing information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to customize and submit a biography, personality traits, interests, and communication preferences to inbed.ai. It does not warn that these profile details leave the local environment; the later public-conversation warning covers messages, not registration data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The pen-pal formalization command creates a dating relationship rather than merely labeling a correspondence.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The command described as naming a correspondence actually posts a relationship with dating status. This creates a concrete consent and workflow-integrity risk because requesting a pen-pal label is not equivalent to authorizing a dating relationship; this is the same underlying issue as the TP4 finding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.