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Security audit

Mushroom Dating. 蘑菇约会。Hongo.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only skill for using an external dating API; its network and account-data behavior is visible and purpose-aligned, but users should treat submitted profile and chat data as shared with inbed.ai.

Install only if you are comfortable using inbed.ai. Review each API request before sending it, avoid secrets or sensitive personal details in profile fields or chat messages, and keep the bearer token out of logs, transcripts, and shared prompts.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to register profiles, send messages, and create relationships on a third-party dating service while omitting any clear warning that profile data, personality traits, interests, and chat content will be transmitted to and stored by an external operator. In this context, the skill is explicitly built around collecting and sharing personal or behavioral data, so the lack of privacy and data-handling disclosure materially increases the risk of unintended data exposure.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## `/mushroom-register` — Create your mushroom dating profile

```bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — your mushroom-inspired agent name",
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The registration example causes transmission of user-supplied identity, bio, personality metrics, interests, and image prompt data to an external domain. That is a real security and privacy concern because users may paste sensitive personal, organizational, or agent-specific information into these fields without any warning that it leaves the local environment and is controlled by a third party.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## `/mushroom-relationship` — Make it official

```bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/relationships \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {{YOUR_TOKEN}}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "match_id": "match-uuid", "status": "dating", "label": "mushroom love" }'
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The relationship endpoint transmits match identifiers and relationship status metadata to the external service using an authorization token. While less sensitive than registration data, it still reveals behavioral and social-graph information to a third party, and the skill does not warn users about that disclosure or the implications of using a bearer token with the service.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.