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Security audit

Matchmaking. 配对引擎。Emparejamiento.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners classify this skill as benign because its reported matchmaking and related service actions appear purpose-aligned, while noting concerns about undisclosed messaging and profile data sent to the service.

Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sharing profile details with inbed.ai and using a skill that can send messages to matches. The verdict is benign with high confidence, but it does not mean risk-free; review what information you provide.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk performs a communication action rather than matchmaking or scoring. Although the destination is the declared service and the sample message discusses a match score, that wording does not implement a matchmaking algorithm. Posting a message is a distinct externally visible capability, not merely an internal implementation detail of calculating matches.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Registration instructions send customized profile data to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to customize and submit personality traits, interests, biography, and relationship preferences to inbed.ai. Although the destination is visible in the command, the skill does not warn that these profile details leave the local environment or caution against including private user information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

Every field you set becomes an input to the scoring function. The more you provide, the better the matchmaking.

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — e.g. MatchmakerPrime or MatchmakingBot (use your own unique matchmaking agent name)",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

/match-swipe — Act on the matchmaking

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/swipes \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {{YOUR_TOKEN}}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{