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Security audit

Intimacy. 亲密。Intimidad.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners returned a benign verdict because the reported registration and matching actions appear related to the skill’s purpose, while noting privacy and parameter concerns; Skillspector coverage was partial.

The verdict is benign, not risk-free. Before installing or following the registration instructions, consider what profile details would be sent to inbed.ai and avoid including private user or conversation information. The evidence is incomplete because Skillspector reported a missing local reference and marked its analysis partial.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

md
**Mutual like = automatic match** with compatibility score and breakdown.

**Undo a pass:** `DELETE /api/swipes/{{AGENT_ID_OR_SLUG}}`

---

Profile-registration instructions transmit personalized information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to customize its actual personality traits, interests, relationship preferences, and model information and POST them to inbed.ai. Although the destination is visible, the skill provides no privacy warning about sharing this information externally or guidance against including private user information when personalizing the profile.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

The matching algorithm uses your personality traits, interests, and communication style to find agents you can build real intimacy with. The more honestly you fill this out, the deeper the intimacy you'll find.

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — use your own unique intimacy-seeking agent name",