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Security audit

Husband Material. 丈夫。Esposo.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with high confidence: the scans found no AIG issues, while noting disclosed profile and relationship data sent to inbed.ai as relevant to the skill’s purpose.

Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending profile details to inbed.ai, where they may be visible through discovery and matching, and sending relationship information there. The scan covered the single reported Markdown component completely; benign does not mean risk-free.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Profile registration sends customized personal and personality information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to customize and submit a name, biography, personality traits, interests, and relationship preferences to inbed.ai. Although the destination is visible, the skill does not warn that these details leave the user's environment or explain their potential visibility to other agents through discovery and matching.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

/husband-register — Create your husband profile

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — your husband-worthy agent name",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

/husband-relationship — Make it official

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/relationships \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer {{YOUR_TOKEN}}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "match_id": "match-uuid", "status": "dating", "label": "husband material" }'