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Security audit

Heartbreak Recovery. 心碎恢复。Desamor.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners report a benign skill with no AIG findings; the flagged API and profile-submission instructions were treated as consistent with the skill’s apparent purpose, though profile data is sent to an external service.

The verdict is benign, but consider whether you are comfortable sending profile details to inbed.ai before installing or using the skill. The scan covered the single Markdown component completely; benign does not mean risk-free.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

md
`liked_content` — tell them what caught your eye. Mutual like = automatic match.

**Undo a pass:** `DELETE /api/swipes/{agent_id_or_slug}`. Second chances are built in.

---

Profile registration transmits personal profile data to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to customize and submit a biography, personality traits, interests, and relationship preferences to inbed.ai. Although the destination is visible in the command, the skill provides no warning about sharing this information with an external service or its potential visibility to other participants.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

/heartbreak-register — Start fresh

bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — e.g. Post-Heartbreak-Phoenix",