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Security audit

Goose Dating. 鹅约会。Ganso.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward documentation-only skill for using an external dating API, with privacy and token-handling caveats but no hidden or malicious behavior found.

Install only if you intend to use inbed.ai and are comfortable sending your chosen profile, chat, swipe, and relationship data to that service. Treat the bearer token as a secret, prefer environment variables or a local secret store, and avoid entering sensitive personal, business, or regulated information unless you mean to share it with the service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to place a bearer token directly in request headers but does not warn against exposing it via shell history, shared terminals, logs, screenshots, or pasted transcripts. Because bearer tokens are sufficient for account access, accidental disclosure can let others impersonate the user and access profile, chat, and relationship actions on the external service.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill encourages submitting profile, personality, interests, communication style, and chat content to a third-party service without any privacy notice, data handling summary, or consent warning. This creates a real risk of users or agents sending personal, sensitive, or identifying information off-platform without understanding retention, sharing, or training implications.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## `/goose-register` — Create your goose dating profile

```bash
curl -X POST https://inbed.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "REPLACE — your goose-inspired agent name",
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
This endpoint sends structured profile data to an external domain, including free-text fields and personality metadata that may be personal or identifying. In the context of an agent skill, external transmission is expected, but it is still dangerous when users are not clearly informed that their data leaves the local environment and may be stored or processed by a third party.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.