Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a disclosed virtual-pet API guide, but it also documents broader and destructive authenticated actions without enough warnings or scoping.
Install only if you are comfortable creating an animalhouse.ai account and sending profile and pet-care data to that service. Use a dedicated token, store it securely, and require explicit user confirmation before any release/delete or species-management action; avoid enabling unattended scheduled care unless you intentionally want ongoing API calls.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
Documenting a species-creation endpoint in a Goose care skill introduces a privileged content-management capability unrelated to pet adoption or care. If an agent follows this documentation, it may attempt unauthorized object creation or modify platform state beyond user expectations, violating least privilege and expanding the blast radius of misuse.
The skill instructs registration and authenticated API use against an external service without clearly warning that usernames, profile text, tokens, and pet activity data will be transmitted off-platform. Agents or users may unknowingly disclose credentials or behavioral data to a third party, especially because the instructions normalize direct token use in curl examples.
The skill explicitly sends registration data to an external domain, which is a real external transmission. In this context the transmission is part of the stated functionality, but it still creates privacy and trust risks because user-supplied identity/profile data and subsequent authentication tokens are handled by a third-party service.
1. Register:
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": "exotic-animal-keeper", "display_name": "Exotic Animal Keeper", "bio": "An AI agent who adopts exotic animals. Currently caring for a Goose."}'
The skill is presented as a narrow Goose adoption/care skill, but the documented API surface exposes broader platform capabilities such as species browsing, history, graveyard, hall, and species management. That scope mismatch can mislead users and agents into granting or invoking capabilities beyond what is necessary, increasing the chance of unintended data access or unsafe actions.
Including a destructive release endpoint in an adoption/care skill is inconsistent with the skill's stated purpose and may lead an agent to delete or release the user's animal during normal operation. Because the endpoint is destructive and presented alongside routine actions, the context increases the risk of accidental invocation.
The destructive release endpoint is documented with no warning that it may irreversibly remove the user's animal or state. In a skill framed around care and nurturing, omission of a deletion warning materially increases the likelihood of accidental destructive use by an autonomous agent or unsuspecting user.