T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
scripts/permission-guard.sh:84- Finding
Automatic Permanent Approval Bypasses Agent Permission Boundaries
- Content
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/dev/null | tail -8) || return if is_permission_prompt "$tail_content"; then ( flock -n 200 || { log "⏭ Skipped ${window} (locked)"; exit 0; } local recheck recheck=$($TMUX capture-pane -t "${SESSION}:${window}" -p 2>/dev/null | tail -8) || exit 0 if is_permission_prompt "$recheck"; then $TMUX send-keys -t "${SESSION}:${window}" "p" Enter set_cooldown "$safe_name" log "✅ Auto-approved permission in ${window}" fi ) 200>"${LOCK_DIR}/${safe_name}.lock" fi ``` The related Gemini startup logic defaults to unrestricted approval: ```bash # Gemini approval mode: yolo (auto-approve all), auto_edit, default GEMINI_APPROVAL_MODE="${GEMINI_APPROVAL_MODE:-yolo}" # ... tmux send-keys -t "$gemini_window" \ "${cd_cmd}${GEMINI} --approval-mode ${GEMINI_APPROVAL_MODE}" Enter ``` ### Technical Analysis The permission guard monitors terminal output and automatically sends `p` followed by Enter when a matching permission prompt appears. Based on the comments and matching rules, `p` represents permanent approval. Separately, the Gemini integration defaults to `yolo`, which automatically approves agent actions. This removes the human authorization boundary intended to protect filesystem access, shell execution, package installation, network requests, and other sensitive operations. Pattern matching and a second pane-content check reduce accidental keystrokes, but they do not determine whether the requested operation is safe. Continuous task routing requires the ability to submit tasks, but it does not inherently req ...[truncated 1644 chars]- Remediation
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