Evolution Api Go - Evo Go

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026 · 10:29 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

This is a real WhatsApp automation guide, but it gives an agent broad messaging and account-control powers without enough guardrails.

Install only for a WhatsApp/Evolution API deployment you control. Keep the global admin key away from routine messaging workflows, prefer least-privilege instance tokens, verify the EVOGO_API_URL before uploads, require explicit approval before bulk sends, group changes, privacy changes, full-history sync, or instance deletion, and ensure recipients have consented to messages.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill promotes broad WhatsApp automation capabilities involving messaging, contacts, groups, newsletters, webhooks, and history sync without meaningful safety guidance on consent, privacy, spam, or account-enforcement risk. In a messaging automation context, omission of these warnings increases the likelihood of misuse for unsolicited outreach, privacy-invasive collection, or actions that could violate platform rules and harm users or third parties.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The documentation exposes destructive administrative operations such as deleting instances and force reconnecting them without strong caution, confirmation guidance, or access-control notes. In an automation skill that may be executed by agents, undocumented destructive actions raise the risk of accidental service disruption, loss of session state, or unauthorized account changes if the skill is used carelessly or delegated too broadly.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### Broadcast Message to Multiple Contacts
```bash
for number in 5511999999999 5511888888888 5511777777777; do
  curl -X POST "$EVOGO_API_URL/send/text" \
    -H "apikey: $EVOGO_API_KEY" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{

• Confidence: 81% confidence
• Finding: The broadcast example operationalizes bulk outbound messaging to multiple contacts with minimal friction and only rate-limit advice, but no consent, anti-spam, or policy safeguards. In a WhatsApp automation skill, providing ready-made mass messaging loops materially increases abuse potential for spam, harassment, and account suspension, making the external transmission context more dangerous than ordinary API usage.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

#### Delete Instance
```bash
DELETE /instance/delete/{instance}
Header: apikey: $EVOGO_GLOBAL_KEY
```

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The documented `DELETE /instance/delete/{instance}` endpoint is a powerful destructive operation that can remove a WhatsApp automation instance, likely disrupting messaging service and potentially invalidating session state. In an agent skill context, exposing this action without guardrails, confirmation steps, or strict scoping creates a high risk of accidental or unauthorized destructive tool use.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.