T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
openclaw-plugin/actions/skills.mjs:75- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Is Piped Directly into Bash
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed browser automation and skill-runtime tool, but its skill install and discovery paths include review-worthy unsafe remote install and overly broad network-fetch behavior.
Install only if you deliberately need local browser automation and JS Eyes skill runtime support. Keep the server on localhost with token authentication, leave raw eval disabled unless a task truly requires it, use the staged `skills/plan-install` plus CLI approval path instead of the `curl | bash` command, avoid untrusted custom registries, and consider disabling Native Messaging auto-install and skill directory watchers in hardened environments.
openclaw-plugin/actions/skills.mjs:75Unverified Remote Installer Is Piped Directly into Bash
openclaw-plugin/actions/skills.mjs:27Caller-Controlled Registry URL Enables Server-Side Request Forgery and Unbounded Response Processing
packages/protocol/skills.js:560Registry-Controlled Bundle URLs Permit Internal Network Requests and Unbounded Downloads
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The file explicitly instructs users to link, trust, and invoke external skills, and it notes that worker mode is not an OS sandbox and cannot fully contain filesystem, process, or network access. Dynamic loading and execution of externally linked skill modules therefore creates a real high-risk code-execution boundary: a trusted or mistakenly trusted skill can execute arbitrary local code with host-reachable capabilities.
The script.execute action accepts arbitrary JavaScript and runs it in a chosen browser tab, enabling unrestricted DOM access, content extraction, request triggering, form interaction, and page modification in the user's authenticated browser context. That can be used to steal sensitive data from web apps, manipulate transactions, or bypass intended workflow constraints through the browser's existing trust/session state.
Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal