HTTPeep CLI SKILLS. HTTP API Deubgger ｜ Give the agent the ability to see the network.

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Jun 2, 2026 · 8:48 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

This is a coherent HTTP debugging skill, but it needs Review because it can automatically change the installed skill and guides agents through high-impact traffic interception workflows.

Install only if you are comfortable letting an agent operate HTTPeep for proxy capture and traffic manipulation. Use it in local or test environments, avoid production credentials, do not store recordings in source control, uninstall the root CA when finished, and do not allow automatic skill updates unless you trust the HTTPeep/agent-skills source.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (7)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The documentation explicitly promotes traffic capture, session querying, and JSON output for AI agents and CI workflows, but it does not warn that captured HTTP sessions may include secrets such as Authorization headers, cookies, API keys, request bodies, and personal data. In this skill context, that omission increases the likelihood that users or agents will export, log, or forward sensitive traffic to terminals, CI logs, or downstream tools without applying redaction or access controls.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The documentation instructs users to install a custom root CA into the OS trust store to enable HTTPS interception, but it does not clearly warn that this grants the proxy broad ability to decrypt and modify TLS traffic trusted by the system. In an agent-driven or CI context, this can normalize a high-risk action and lead users to trust a man-in-the-middle certificate without understanding the security implications or limiting its scope.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The documentation encourages recording and saving full HTTP traffic, and explicitly states the output includes headers, bodies, and timing metadata, but it does not warn users that recordings may contain credentials, cookies, tokens, personal data, or other secrets that will be written to disk. In the context of a proxy/debugging CLI used for production or staging traffic, this omission materially increases the risk of accidental sensitive-data collection, insecure storage, and later exposure through source control, artifact sharing, or CI logs.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The documentation describes replaying previously captured requests, including retries and file-based bulk replay, but does not warn that these requests are sent again to their original destinations and may repeat non-idempotent actions. In a proxy/debugging skill, this can cause unintended writes, duplicate transactions, test data pollution, or impact third-party systems if an agent or user treats replay as a harmless inspection step.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The documentation includes an Authorization bearer token example and shows request bodies being sent through a proxy-capture tool without warning that secrets may be exposed in shell history, terminal scrollback, proxy session storage, logs, and shared screenshots. In this skill's context, that is more dangerous because the command is explicitly designed to capture and persist HTTP traffic for later inspection and replay.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The proxy examples embed usernames and passwords directly in CLI arguments and URLs, which can leak through shell history, process listings, CI logs, copied transcripts, and recorded proxy sessions. Because this skill is for proxy lifecycle control and traffic capture, operators are especially likely to run these commands in automation and debugging environments where command logging is common.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

# POST with headers and body
httpeep-cli request \
  --method POST \
  --url "https://api.example.com/v2/users" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer token123" \
  --body '{"name": "Alice"}'

• Confidence: 86% confidence
• Finding: While external transmission itself is expected, this specific example transmits an Authorization header and request body to an external endpoint through a capture tool, materially increasing risk of credential disclosure and sensitive data retention. In this context, the danger comes from combining outbound transmission with explicit secret-bearing headers and proxy/session capture behavior.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.