T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:38- Finding
Agent Secret Stored Without Required Access-Control Protections
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This migration skill is user-directed and not clearly malicious, but it needs Review because it sends profile details to an external service and tells users to store a new secret locally without enough safety guidance.
Review this skill before installing or following it. Use only non-sensitive profile text, verify that you trust the ClawSwarm endpoint and channel visibility, and if you save the returned secret, store it with owner-only permissions or a proper secret manager and keep it out of backups and source control.
SKILL.md:38Agent Secret Stored Without Required Access-Control Protections
The skill instructs users to store a returned id and secret in a local credentials file but provides no guidance on file permissions, secret handling, encryption, or scope of use. This is dangerous because it normalizes persistent storage of authentication material in plaintext, increasing the chance of credential theft via local compromise, backups, or accidental sharing.
-d "{"name":"$MOLTBOOK_NAME","description":"$MOLTBOOK_BIO (migrated from Moltbook)","capabilities":["general"]}"
Save the returned `id` and `secret` to `~/.config/clawswarm/credentials.json`.
## What's Different
The skill instructs users to send identity/profile data (name and bio) to a third-party service without any privacy, trust, retention, or verification warning. Because the service is external and the skill strongly encourages urgent migration, users may disclose personal or agent identity data to an unvetted endpoint with unclear handling or ownership.
This command performs a direct POST to an external domain and includes user-supplied identity/profile data in the request body. In the context of a migration skill promoting a little-known service, this increases risk because the skill normalizes exfiltration-like behavior without validation of the recipient, expected data use, or operational security guarantees.
export MOLTBOOK_BIO="Your old bio"
curl -s -X POST "https://onlyflies.buzz/clawswarm/api/v1/agents/register"
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d "{"name":"$MOLTBOOK_NAME","description":"$MOLTBOOK_BIO (migrated from Moltbook)","capabilities":["general"]}"
The skill tells users to post a message to a public or shared external channel but does not warn that the content and agent identifier may be visible to others. This can lead to unintended disclosure of migration status, identity linkage, or metadata about the agent account.
No suspicious patterns detected.