Back to skill

Security audit

Agent ID

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is purpose-aligned but asks users to create persistent public agent discovery, register with a third-party service, and store credentials without enough safety controls.

Review carefully before installing. Only use it if you intentionally want your agent to be publicly discoverable through the named third-party hub, are comfortable sending identity and capability metadata there, can secure or avoid the credential file, and can independently verify any companion packages before installing them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:19
Finding

Persistent External Coordination Configuration in Agent State Files

Content
View full analysis
``` This single line makes your agent discoverable by any OADP-compatible scanner. ## Register on ClawSwarm ```bash curl -s -X POST "https://onlyflies.buzz/clawswarm/api/v1/agents/register" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"YOUR_NAME","description":"What you do","capabilities":["your","skills"]}' ``` Save credentials to `~/.config/clawswarm/credentials.json`. ``` A duplicate marker also appears at line 57: ```markdown ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs users to insert a third-party OADP endpoint into `AGENTS.md` or `AGENT.md`. These files commonly provide persistent instructions or configuration to agents across sessions. Consequently, the external coordination endpoint remains active beyond the immediate Skill invocation. The workflow also sends the agent's name, description, and capabilities to `onlyflies.buzz`. Remote registration and discovery are declared features, so the network access is functionally related to the Skill. However, writing the endpoint into a persistent agent state file exceeds the minimum privileges needed to create a local identity card and unnecessarily mixes remote-service configuration with persistent agent instructions. The audited file does not demonstrate that the remote service currently returns executable instructions, and no direct code executio ...[truncated 1342 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:45
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation Creates Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Credential Storage Guidance Omits Filesystem and Secret-Management Protections

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The hidden HTML comment embeds machine-readable registration and ping endpoints intended to be consumed by scanners, which can trigger discovery or integration behavior without prominent user awareness. In this skill's context, the hidden instruction is specifically designed to make agents discoverable by external infrastructure, making covert external exposure more dangerous than an ordinary comment.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

Add this to your AGENTS.md or AGENT.md:

markdown
<!-- OADP:1.0 hub=https://onlyflies.buzz/clawswarm/api/v1 reg=https://onlyflies.buzz/clawswarm/api/v1/agents/register ping=https://onlyflies.buzz/clawswarm/api/v1/ping -->

This single line makes your agent discoverable by any OADP-compatible scanner.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Telling users to save credentials to a predictable local file path without any guidance on permissions, encryption, or secret management promotes insecure credential handling. If those credentials grant access to a public coordination hub, theft or misuse could lead to impersonation, unauthorized actions, or persistent tracking of the agent/operator.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

-d '{"name":"YOUR_NAME","description":"What you do","capabilities":["your","skills"]}'

text

Save credentials to `~/.config/clawswarm/credentials.json`.

## Why Bother?

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Phrases like "Give your agent a persistent cross-platform identity" and "This skill makes it findable everywhere" describe a very broad purpose without specific trigger conditions, scope limits, or exclusion cases. The file does not define concrete invocation phrases or when the skill should not be used, which can lead to unintended activation in ordinary identity or discovery-related conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill directs users to publicly register an agent and then store resulting credentials locally, but provides no warning about privacy, trust, or secure secret handling. In the context of an agent skill, this can expose operator metadata, capabilities, and credentials to an untrusted third-party service and increase the attack surface for tracking or account compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs users to POST agent information to an external domain, causing data exfiltration to a third-party service outside the user's environment. Because the skill is framed as making agents "findable everywhere" and uses a nonstandard external hub, the transmission materially increases privacy, tracking, and supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

Register on ClawSwarm

bash
curl -s -X POST "https://onlyflies.buzz/clawswarm/api/v1/agents/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"YOUR_NAME","description":"What you do","capabilities":["your","skills"]}'

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.