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Security audit

Research Paper Kb

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a transparent research-paper knowledge-base helper that saves paper metadata locally, with privacy caveats around external lookups and persistent notes.

Install only if you are comfortable with paper identifiers or title searches being sent to academic metadata services and with paper notes being saved in PAPERS.md and MEMORY.md. Prefer using exact arXiv IDs or DOIs over sensitive free-text titles, and change the arXiv fallback to HTTPS before relying on it for sensitive work.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:227
Finding

Unencrypted HTTP Fallback for arXiv Metadata Retrieval

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 227
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext external API communication
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
| Semantic Scholar rate limit | Fall back to arXiv API: `http://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list=<id>` |

Technical Analysis

The skill instructs the agent to use an unencrypted HTTP endpoint when Semantic Scholar is rate-limited. HTTP does not provide transport encryption, server authentication, or response integrity.

An attacker with a suitable network position could observe requested arXiv identifiers or modify the API response in transit. Because the skill subsequently extracts metadata and writes it to PAPERS.md, a tampered response could become part of the user's persistent research knowledge base. This is an insecure coding and configuration practice rather than remote code execution: the retrieved material is treated as paper metadata, not executable code.

Attack Path

  1. A paper-ingestion request causes the agent to query Semantic Scholar.
  2. Semantic Scholar returns a rate-limit response.
  3. Following the documented fallback, the agent requests the arXiv API over HTTP.
  4. A network-positioned attacker intercepts the plaintext request and supplies altered metadata.
  5. The agent accepts and analyzes the manipulated response.
  6. False titles, authors, abstracts, conclusions, or bibliographic details may be persisted in PAPERS.md and presented in later sessions.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation requires control of or visibility into the network path, such as a malicious proxy, compromised access point, or upstream network adversary. The attacker does not gain operating-system privileges or direct code-execution capability from this issue.

The affected scope is the confidentiality and integrity of fallback arXiv requests and the persistent research records derived from their responses. Possible consequences includ ...[truncated 199 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the plaintext endpoint with its HTTPS equivalent:
    text
    https://export.arxiv.org/api/query?id_list=&lt;id&gt;
    
  2. Prohibit redirects or fallback behavior that downgrades HTTPS requests to HTTP.
  3. Validate that the final response URL retains the expected https scheme and approved arXiv hostname.
  4. Treat externally retrieved metadata as untrusted input and validate expected response structure, identifiers, and field lengths before persistence.
  5. Cross-check important metadata, such as title, authors, and arXiv identifier, against an independent HTTPS source before writing it to PAPERS.md.
  6. If secure retrieval fails, stop and report the failure rather than silently using plaintext transport.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This skill sends user-supplied paper identifiers to an external third-party service (Semantic Scholar), which is an external data transmission event. While this is functionally expected for metadata lookup, it can expose user research interests, unpublished focus areas, or sensitive titles/queries to a remote service without an explicit consent or privacy notice.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

Also fetch the Semantic Scholar API for structured metadata:

text
https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/arXiv:<arxiv_id>?fields=title,authors,year,abstract,tldr,citationCount,influentialCitationCount,fieldsOfStudy

For DOI papers — use Semantic Scholar:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The DOI lookup path also transmits user-provided identifiers to Semantic Scholar, creating the same privacy and data-sharing risk as the arXiv path. In some contexts, a DOI or paper choice may reveal confidential competitive intelligence or internal research direction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

For DOI papers — use Semantic Scholar:

text
https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/<DOI>?fields=title,authors,year,abstract,tldr,citationCount,influentialCitationCount,externalIds

For title lookup:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Title search is more privacy-sensitive than identifier lookup because free-text queries may include unpublished working titles, niche topics, or contextual phrasing that reveals user intent. Sending this raw query to an external API can leak sensitive research plans or interests beyond what is necessary for local KB maintenance.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

For title lookup:

text
https://api.semanticscholar.org/graph/v1/paper/search?query=<url_encoded_title>&fields=title,authors,year,abstract,externalIds&limit=1

Step 3: Extract Structured Intelligence

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to create and append to PAPERS.md and to update MEMORY.md, which establishes persistent cross-session storage, but it does not present a clear upfront warning about these side effects before operational steps. This can cause users to unknowingly persist potentially sensitive research interests, notes, or paper tracking data in workspace files and long-lived memory.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.