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Security audit

ia-writing

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a writing and editing skill with no executable code, external data flow, persistence, or hidden high-impact authority.

Installers should treat this as a prose-editing aid, not as permission to publish, impersonate authorship, remove required provenance, or change factual claims. Review rewritten text for accuracy, citations, and any disclosure obligations before using it publicly.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SPEC.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
Out of scope:
- Acting as the runtime instructions themselves (those live in `SKILL.md`).
- Trigger phrasings already covered by adjacent `ia-*` skills (`validate-plugin` flags >70% description overlap as DUPLICATE_TRIGGER).
- <!-- to fill in: domain-specific exclusions when the skill drifts -->

## Trigger Context

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/pr-descriptions.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

md
When the change benefits from a visual, pick the shape based on what the change is:

- **Mermaid diagram**: topology with edges. Components that send messages to each other, request flow across services, a state machine's transitions, a dependency graph. Anything where the *relationships* are the point.
- **Markdown table**: rows with parallel attributes. A before/after comparison of config values, a list of endpoints with their verbs and paths, a comparison of options with their tradeoffs. Anything where the *structure is grid-shaped*.
- **Pseudocode**: an algorithm change. Ten lines of the new branching beats a paragraph describing it.
- **Call tree**: a control-flow change: which function now calls which, as an indented tree.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The description repeatedly constrains the skill to English-writing contexts by naming "copy, docs, blog posts, emails, or PRs" and focusing on removing "AI language," but it does not state that language choice follows the user's preference or that other locales are supported. This creates a natural-language policy risk if the organization requires language/locale neutrality unless the user opts in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.