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Security audit

ia-writing-tests

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a markdown-only test-writing guide with no executable install or persistence behavior, and the scanner concerns are explained by benign testing guidance and documentation comments.

Install only if you want stricter test-writing discipline. Expect it to push for real assertions, careful fixture design, and running project test commands, but it does not add code, services, credentials, or persistence by itself.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
ip conditions, or misleading green summaries, read [false-pass-oracle-traps.md](./references/false-pass-oracle-traps.md).

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SPEC.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
Out of scope:
- Acting as the runtime instructions themselves (those live in `SKILL.md`).
- Trigger phrasings already covered by adjacent `ia-*` skills (`validate-plugin` flags >70% description overlap as DUPLICATE_TRIGGER).
- <!-- to fill in: domain-specific exclusions when the skill drifts -->

## Trigger Context

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/test-smells.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

md
**Symptom:** Methods like `reset()`, `clearState()`, `setTestMode()` that exist only because tests need them.

**Fix:** If tests need to reset state, the code has a design problem. Refactor to make state explicit and injectable.

### Snapshot tests as the only test

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.