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Security audit

ia-pinescript

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a focused Pine Script guidance skill with no executable code, persistence, credential handling, or hidden runtime behavior found.

Install this only if you want Pine Script-specific coding guidance. Expect it to encourage checking current TradingView documentation before version-sensitive work; no local credential access or persistent behavior was found.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SPEC.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
Out of scope:
- Acting as the runtime instructions themselves (those live in `SKILL.md`).
- Trigger phrasings already covered by adjacent `ia-*` skills (`validate-plugin` flags >70% description overlap as DUPLICATE_TRIGGER).
- <!-- to fill in: domain-specific exclusions when the skill drifts -->

## Trigger Context

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/evidence/findings-log.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
- Observed behavior: skill injected because regex `tradingview|...` matched bare "tradingview" in the prompt; agent then loaded ia-simplifying-code and ia-code-review (correct skills), wasting the injection
- Skill delta:
  - `plugins/whetstone/hooks/skill-patterns.sh:65`: tightened regex so bare `tradingview` no longer matches; required Pine-context qualifier within 30 chars (`tradingview.{0,30}(pine|indicator|strategy|chart|script)`); added symmetric `\bstrategy\b.{0,20}(pine|trading.?view)` clause
  - `plugins/whetstone/skills/ia-pinescript/SKILL.md:4-7`: rewrote description to scope triggers to `.pine` files or TradingView Pine indicators/strategies (drops standalone "TradingView", "indicators", "strategies", "backtesting" as triggers)
  - `distillery/tests/fixtures/triggers/ia-pinescript.jsonl`: added two negative-case fixtures from the actual misfire prompts
- Anonymization: redacted nothing; both prompts were generic infrastructure audits with no sensitive content