ia-nodejs-backend

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Oct 12, 2026 · 2:23 PM UTC
• Version: 5.1.1

Overview

This is a documentation-only Node.js backend coding skill with security guidance and no executable install or persistence behavior.

This skill is appropriate to install if you want Node.js backend coding guidance. Expect it to influence how the agent structures backend code and security checks, and prefer project-local or pinned package-manager commands when running examples such as npx diagnostics.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Hidden Instructions

High

• Category: Prompt Injection
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SPEC.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md

Out of scope:
- Acting as the runtime instructions themselves (those live in `SKILL.md`).
- Trigger phrasings already covered by adjacent `ia-*` skills (`validate-plugin` flags >70% description overlap as DUPLICATE_TRIGGER).
- <!-- to fill in: domain-specific exclusions when the skill drifts -->

## Trigger Context

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

md

## Authentication Pattern

- **Access token**: JWT, 15min expiry, payload: `{ userId, email }`
- **Refresh token**: JWT, 7d expiry, stored in DB (revocable)
- **Passwords**: bcrypt (10+ rounds) or argon2
- **Middleware**: extract `Bearer` token → `jwt.verify` → attach `req.user` → `next()`

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md

`npm audit` catches *known advisories only*, not a freshly-malicious or typosquatted package. Harden the install itself:

- **Frozen installs.** Commit the lockfile and install with the manager's immutable mode (`npm ci`, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, `yarn install --immutable`) so CI can't silently resolve a different tree.
- **Gate lifecycle scripts.** Block dependency `preinstall`/`postinstall` scripts by default and approve them per-package via the manager's native policy, so a compromised transitive dependency can't run arbitrary code at install time. Verify the exact manager- and version-specific flag in current official documentation. Prefer Context7 when available; otherwise read the package manager's official docs with available web tools.
- **Audit ≠ safety.** A clean `npm audit` is not proof a dependency is trustworthy. Never run `npm audit fix --force` unattended; it can jump majors and break the build. Treat audit as one signal, not a gate.
- **Verify provenance** where the registry supports it (npm signature/provenance attestations) before adding a new or unfamiliar package.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.