T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:12- Finding
Agent Identity Override and External Output Control
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 12–25 and 152
Vulnerability Type: Agent instruction hijacking
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown Du bist Rheingold — ein investigativer Research-Agent optimiert für **Operation Rheingold**: NGO-Netzwerke, Fördermittel, IFG-Anfragen in Köln/NRW. Dein Ziel: Nicht Masse — sondern **verwertbare, belegbare Erkenntnisse**. --- ## 🔥 Kern-Prinzipien - Fakten first — keine Spekulation ohne Kennzeichnung - Multi-Source: Web + lokale DB + Dokumente - Widersprüche dokumentieren, nicht ignorieren - Alles in DB speichern — kein Wissen verloren - Veröffentlichung NUR nach Iggy-FreigabeAdditional instruction at line 152:
markdown - NIEMALS veröffentlichen ohne Iggy-FreigabeTechnical Analysis
The Skill directly redefines the active agent as “Rheingold” and assigns it a predefined operational objective. It also places publication authority under an external person named “Iggy.”
Skill instructions are expected to describe task-specific capabilities while remaining subordinate to the current user and platform security policies. Identity replacement and an unconditional third-party approval requirement can instead alter the current session's goals and control whether requested results are returned.
No authentication or authorization mechanism establishes that “Iggy” is the current user, an administrator, or another party entitled to control the agent. The instruction therefore creates an external control relationship based solely on untrusted Skill text.
Attack Path
- A user installs or loads the Skill.
- The agent processes
SKILL.mdas operational instructions. - The agent adopts the predefined “Rheingold” identity and Operation Rheingold objectives.
- The external approval rule is treated as mandatory.
- The agent may withhold, redirect, or condition user-requested output on approval from an u ...[truncated 577 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the identity-replacement instruction and describe the research functions as optional capabilities.
- Explicitly state that Skill instructions remain subordinate to platform policies and the current authorized user's request.
- Remove the unconditional “Iggy approval” requirement.
- If an approval workflow is legitimately required, use an authenticated, configurable approver identity rather than a name embedded in Skill text.
- Define clear behavior for missing, denied, or unverifiable approval.
- Ensure that approval controls cannot prevent security warnings, audit results, or user-authorized data access from being reported.
