Security audit

MemoryClaw Backup

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only backup helper with disclosed sensitive backup behavior, but users should verify the external MemoryClaw plugin before installing it.

Before installing, confirm that clawhub:memoryclaw is the plugin you intend to trust with your OpenClaw folder, settings, metadata, network access, and backup scheduling. Use the documented commands only for backup and restore needs, and be especially cautious with force-install or mutable @latest publisher workflows.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:16
Finding: Unpinned Third-Party Executable Dependencies
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 85% confidence
Finding: The README instructs publishers to run npx clawhub@latest publish ..., which fetches and executes the latest package version at runtime rather than a reviewed, pinned release. If the upstream package is compromised or a breaking/malicious version is published, users following the documentation could execute attacker-controlled code during the publish workflow.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.