Universal Command Pattern

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 2:17 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a coherent developer guide for using a command abstraction package, with a normal but mutable npm install step users should review.

Before installing, review the npm package and consider pinning an audited version or using lockfiles. The skill itself is documentation-oriented and does not show hidden execution, persistence, or data exfiltration behavior.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:15

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 15–18
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

markdown

## Installation

```bash
npm install @supernal/universal-command

text

### Technical Analysis

The installation instructions retrieve `@supernal/universal-command` from the npm registry without specifying an exact, audited version. The project also contains no package lockfile or integrity metadata that would ensure reproducible dependency resolution.

Consequently, the effective package contents may change after this skill has been reviewed. An npm package can also execute lifecycle scripts during installation. If the package, a transitive dependency, its publisher account, or the associated supply chain is compromised, following this instruction could execute attacker-controlled code with the permissions of the user running `npm install`.

The referenced source is the standard npm registry rather than an obviously malicious or spoofed domain. No malicious package behavior is demonstrated in the supplied artifact; the finding concerns the unsafe and mutable dependency-installation pattern.

### Attack Path

1. A user or agent loads the skill and follows its installation instructions.
2. `npm install @supernal/universal-command` resolves the package version currently selected by npm rather than a version fixed during security review.
3. An attacker compromises the package, a transitive dependency, or a package-publisher account and publishes a malicious version.
4. npm downloads that version and may execute its lifecycle scripts during installation.
5. The malicious code runs under the invoking user's account and can access resources available to that account.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user performing the installation. Depending on that user's environment, the scope may 
...[truncated 473 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Pin the dependency to a specific version that has been reviewed, rather than relying on npm's current version resolution:

  bash

  npm install --save-exact @supernal/universal-command@<audited-version>
  

• Commit package.json and package-lock.json so the exact dependency graph and integrity hashes are recorded.
• Use npm ci in automated and reproducible environments to enforce the lockfile.
• Review the selected package version, its transitive dependencies, provenance, publisher history, and lifecycle scripts before adoption.
• Use npm install --ignore-scripts or an equivalent policy where dependency lifecycle scripts are not required.
• Apply dependency allowlisting, registry controls, lockfile verification, and automated supply-chain scanning in CI.
• Perform upgrades through an explicit review process instead of automatically accepting newly published versions.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep