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Security audit

ImaginePro AI Image Generation API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward ImaginePro API helper that sends user-provided prompts and image URLs to ImaginePro for generation tasks, with no hidden persistence or unrelated local access found.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill access to your ImaginePro API key and sending prompts, image URLs, frame URLs, and task metadata to ImaginePro. Watch credit usage before batch or repeated generation because most operations consume paid credits.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (11)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill requires environment access for an API key and performs network operations, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That makes the skill's effective capabilities less transparent to the host and user, increasing the risk of unintended credential use or outbound requests without clear policy boundaries.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill sends user prompts and, for some operations, image URLs or reference media to a third-party API, but the description does not clearly warn about that data disclosure. Users may provide sensitive prompts or private image links without understanding they will be transmitted off-platform to an external service.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
- `--timeout <seconds>` — Max wait time for `wait` command (default: 300)
- `--interval <seconds>` — Polling interval for `wait` command (default: 5)

## curl Examples

```bash
# Generate with Flux
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Configuration
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BASE_URL = "https://api.imaginepro.ai/api/v1"

# Model name → backend endpoint mapping
MODEL_ENDPOINTS = {
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Configuration
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BASE_URL = "https://api.imaginepro.ai/api/v1"

# Model name → backend endpoint mapping
MODEL_ENDPOINTS = {
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Configuration
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BASE_URL = "https://api.imaginepro.ai/api/v1"

# Model name → backend endpoint mapping
MODEL_ENDPOINTS = {
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Configuration
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BASE_URL = "https://api.imaginepro.ai/api/v1"

# Model name → backend endpoint mapping
MODEL_ENDPOINTS = {
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# Configuration
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

BASE_URL = "https://api.imaginepro.ai/api/v1"

# Model name → backend endpoint mapping
MODEL_ENDPOINTS = {
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
This code sends user-supplied prompts, reference image URLs, and frame/image URLs to a remote third-party API via HTTP requests. While the script purpose is API interaction, there is no explicit user-facing warning in the CLI help or command descriptions that provided content will be transmitted off-system to the ImaginePro service.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The documentation discusses credits and purchasing them, but it does not present a clear upfront warning that normal use of generation endpoints incurs paid charges. This can lead to unintended spending, especially because the skill exposes multiple asynchronous generation and post-processing operations that may be repeatedly invoked by an agent.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
#### POST `/flux/upscale` — Flux Upscale

Upscale any image (not limited to Flux-generated).

**Request:**
```json
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.