T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
- scripts/epaiclt.py:9
- Finding
- Configurable Insecure Transport Can Expose API Credentials and Uploaded Documents## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/epaiclt.py`, lines 9-12, 18-21, and 34-89 **Vulnerability Type**: Unrestricted API endpoint and optional TLS certificate verification **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```python API_BASE = os.getenv("EPAI_API_BASE") API_KEY = os.getenv("EPAI_API_KEY") ACCOUNT = os.getenv("EPAI_ACCOUNT") VERIFY_TLS = os.getenv("EPAI_VERIFY_TLS", "true").lower() == "true" ``` ```python HEADERS = { "Authorization": API_KEY, "Account": ACCOUNT } ``` All HTTP operations construct their destination from the unrestricted `API_BASE` value and use the configurable TLS verification setting. Representative credentialed requests include: ```python def kb_list(): url = f"{API_BASE}/knowledge/list" r = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, verify=VERIFY_TLS, timeout=TIMEOUT) print(json.dumps(r.json(), ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)) ``` File uploads transmit both credentials and local file contents using the same settings: ```python def document_upload(kb_id, files): files = check_file_exists(files) if not files: print("❌ 没有有效文件可上传") return url = f"{API_BASE}/document/upload" parser_config = json.dumps({"lang_detect_enable": False,"backend": "pipeline-high-acc","chunk_type": "general","chunk_num": 256,"parent_chunk_num": 1024,"embed_model": "bge-m3","use_vision": True,"layout": True}) data = {"parser_config": parser_config,"parse": "true","kb_id": kb_id} upload_files = [("files", (os.path.basename(f), open(f, "rb"))) for f in files] r = requests.post(url, headers=HEADERS, data=data, files=upload_files, verify=VERIFY_TLS, timeout=TIMEOUT) print(json.dumps(r.json(), ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)) ``` ### Technical Analysis `EPAI_API_BASE` is accepted without validating its scheme or hostname. The program therefore permits credentialed requests to plain HTTP endpoints or arbitrary hosts ...[truncated 2074 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Parse `EPAI_API_BASE` with a standard URL parser and reject every scheme except `https`. 2. Validate the destination hostname against an explicit allowlist of approved EPAI service domains. 3. Keep certificate verification mandatory in production and do not expose a general-purpose environment variable that silently disables it. 4. If insecure TLS is required for local development, require an explicit development mode, emit a prominent warning, and reject non-loopback destinations. 5. Reject URLs containing embedded credentials, fragments, unexpected ports, or malformed hostnames. 6. Store the API key in a managed secret store and use a narrowly scoped, short-lived credential where the EPAI platform supports it. 7. Avoid placing account or authentication-related data in query strings. In particular, remove the duplicate `Account` query parameter used by `catalog_delete` when the authenticated header is sufficient. 8. Add automated tests confirming that HTTP URLs, unapproved hosts, and disabled TLS verification are rejected before any credentialed request or file upload occurs.