Security audit

Sentry Cli

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Sentry CLI reference, with expected but sensitive token, upload, and account-management workflows that users should handle carefully.

Use this skill as a command reference, not as a reason to run examples blindly. Prefer trusted package-manager installation, use scoped Sentry tokens stored in a secret manager or protected environment, keep .sentryclirc out of source control, and review or redact logs and build artifacts before uploading them to Sentry.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The example `sentry-cli send-event -m "Error" --logfile /var/log/app.log` encourages uploading a local log file to a third-party service without any warning that logs often contain secrets, tokens, PII, or internal system details. In a CLI skill intended for copy-paste operational use, users may run this verbatim and inadvertently disclose sensitive data to Sentry.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 84% confidence
Finding: The authentication guidance shows placing a live auth token directly in environment variables and `.sentryclirc` without any caution about secret management, file permissions, shell history, or avoiding hardcoded credentials. That can lead users to store long-lived tokens insecurely in plaintext config files, shared repos, screenshots, or CI logs.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.