T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Unpinned UI Automation Dependency from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Mac helper is not deceptive, but it needs Review because it can force-quit Chrome, rewrite the default Chrome profile settings, and save screenshots without clear confirmation.
Install only if you are comfortable letting this helper control your live Chrome session. Save browser work first, expect Chrome to be force-closed, and consider using a dedicated Chrome profile. Treat failure screenshots as potentially sensitive because they may capture whatever is visible on screen.
SKILL.md:27Unpinned UI Automation Dependency from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap
scripts/attach.sh:50Overbroad Forced Termination of Google Chrome Processes
scripts/attach.sh:53Non-Atomic and Silently Failing Rewrite of Chrome Preferences
Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.
~/.openclaw/browser/chrome-extension
Load it via `chrome://extensions` → **Developer mode ON** → **Load unpacked**.
**The extension must also be pinned to the toolbar.** The script finds the icon via Chrome's accessibility tree, which only exposes toolbar-pinned extensions — not icons hidden inside the Extensions panel. To pin: click the puzzle-piece icon → click the pin icon next to "OpenClaw Browser Relay".
The script unconditionally force-kills all Google Chrome processes with pkill -9 -f, which can cause data loss, terminate unrelated browsing sessions, and disrupt the user's environment without consent. In this skill context, that behavior is more dangerous because the script is designed for routine automation and may be invoked by an agent, making destructive interruption of an active browser session likely rather than exceptional.
The embedded Python silently edits Chrome's live Preferences file to change session restore and clean-exit state, altering user browser behavior and potentially masking an abnormal shutdown. This is risky because it tampers with persistent user configuration outside an isolated automation profile, and in the context of a helper skill for agent-driven browser access, it could repeatedly modify a real user's primary Chrome profile without visibility.
The skill describes behavior that writes to local files by patching Chrome's Preferences, but it does not declare any tool scope or permissions boundary. That creates a transparency and control gap: an agent or reviewer cannot easily distinguish expected UI automation from filesystem modification, increasing the risk of unintended or overbroad local changes.
The skill performs disruptive and state-changing actions—killing running Chrome instances and modifying a Chrome preference file—without prominently warning about them in the top-level description or quickstart. This can cause data loss, session interruption, or unexpected browser state changes, especially if invoked automatically as a dependency before other tasks.
On failure, the script captures a screenshot to disk without explicit warning, which may record sensitive page contents, credentials, messages, or other on-screen data unrelated to the relay setup. The skill context increases risk because it operates against a live Chrome session and stores artifacts under the user's home directory, creating persistent local exposure of potentially sensitive information.
The script repeats screenshot capture during final verification failure, increasing the amount of sensitive visual data persisted to disk without consent and normalizing silent forensic collection. Because this helper is intended to run automatically during browser setup, repeated failure paths can accumulate screenshots of active browsing content and amplify privacy exposure.
No suspicious patterns detected.